Evidence: Alphabetical
- U.S. should reject UNCLOS because it would create another unaccountable U.N. bureaucracy
- U.S. participation in UNCLOS would undermine military and intelligence operations
- U.S. does not need the Law of the Sea treaty to guarantee navigation rights
- US accession to UNCLOS would uniquely expose it to baseless climate change lawsuits
- US has always resolved maritime disputes with voluntary, bilateral diplomacy -- accession to UNCLOS would compel legally binding dispute resolution
- US successful experience with challenging Russia's claim shows that even as a non party to UNCLOS the US is not a helpless bystander to CLCS
- US actively surveying extended continental shelf and can negotiate bilateral agreements with nations regarding boundaries outside UNCLOS framework
- US within its rights according to international law to develop on extended continental shelf
- US can negotiate bilateral agreements with nations that share maritime borders to delimit ECS borders outside of UNCLOS framework
- UNCLOS tribunal ruling against US on climate change could have broad impact on economy
- US has permanent seat on ISA but not a veto and it could be overruled by regional blocs
- US should challenge excessive coastal state restrictions on military activities within the EEZ
- US should unsign 1994 agreement to resolve legal ambiguity over its actions
- US companies could still mine deep seabed outside UNCLOS by going through foreign subsidiaries
- US accession to UNCLOS would place mining interests directly under regulatory regime of the Authority
- US has already negotiated bilateral agreements with all nations adjoining its claims in the CCZ
- Under 1980 DSMHRA Act, US citizens and corporations are fee to mine deep seabed regardless of whether US is party to UNCLOS
- U.S. is in no position to challenge excessive maritime claims as a non-party to UNCLOS
- US could rely on reciprocal bilateral treaties as proposed in 1980 DSHMRA act as an alternative to UNCLOS
- US would be on hook for supporting an ISA bureaucracy so bloated and wasteful it even gave Russia pause
- UNCLOS protections for navigational freedoms are not unambiguous
- U.S. navy will need to regularly assert and protect its freedom of navigation rights whether US is party to UNCLOS or not
- U.S. allies will help protect navigational freedoms regardless of U.S. accession to UNCLOS
- US ratification of UNCLOS would amount to endorsement of flawed common heritage of mankind principles
- UNCLOS preserves U.S. rights in open ocean outside of territorial waters of coastal states
- UNCLOS provisions directly support and improve ability of Coast Guard to complete its law enforcement and homeland security missions
- UNCLOS convention would have no unique effect on ability of submarines to collect intelligence beyond restrictions already agreed to in 1958 convention
- UNCLOS has been studied and debated at all levels of government for decades with consensus still favoring ratification
- US losing out on tangible opportunities to shape emerging maritime law and reclaim leadership role
- US abstention from UNCLOS is a vulnerability China can exploit to promote its lawfare campaign to control South China Sea
- US naval capacity to conduct maritime interdiction or intelligence operations at risk from excessive claims and lawfare
- U.S. has significant strategic and commercial interests in ensuring that provisions of convention are fully implemented into domestic law
- US has already accepted UNCLOS arbitration in two previous agreements but the Advice and Consent resolution serves to further qualify application
- US advice and consent resolution regarding UNCLOS already excludes military activities from third party arbitration
- U.S. advice and consent resolution for UNCLOS stipulates US restrictions on applicability of third party
- US was leading advocate of system of third party arbitration within UNCLOS because it viewed this as essential to consistent application of the law