Evidence: Alphabetical
- Broad consensus of groups with maritime interests support ratification of UNCLOS
- Benefits to U.S. from UNCLOS support for freedom of navigation rights is outweighed by loss of sovereignty
- Bilateral agreements over seabed jurisdiction would be abrogated by UNCLOS framework
- By remaining outside of convention, US is unable to engage in disputes over Arctic claims within framework
- Becoming party to the convention would strengthen US leadership role within IMO
- Both US and world losing out by US non-participation in UNCLOS
- Broad and consistent consensus of military and political leaders in favor of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS
- Broad consensus of military, academic, and business experts have lined up in support of US ratification of UNCLOS
- Burden of proof on treaty proponents to show what national security gains U.S. will gain from accession to UNCLOS over status quo
- By giving control over fishing stocks to coastal states with adequate resources to manage them, UNCLOS has arguably exacerbated overfishing problem
- Better end user recycling is a viable alternative to deep seabed mining
- Broad, bipartisan consensus because the U.S. pursued and achieved all objectives in negotiations
- Bilateral and regional agreements are a viable solution for resolving concerns over foreign military activities in the EEZ
- Bilateral offshore oil exploration agreement with Mexico already obligates US to participate in Article 82 revenue sharing agreement
- Both UNCLOS and emerging international biodiversity agreements are trying to define scope of resource sharing
- Bilateral investment treaties could resolve existing gaps in UNCLOS law
- Bilateral treaties are insufficient to address issues with underseas cables occurring on the high seas
- Bilateral investment treaties can complement existing UNCLOS regime to fill existing gaps without need to pursue new treaty on underseas cables
- Bush administration carefully weighed risks of acceding to UNCLOS and ruled that it was on balance in U.S. National security interests to ratify
- Bush administration carefully considered risk that ratifying UNCLOS would impose a new tax and concluded that it would not and was resolutely in our best interest regardless
- By ratifying UNCLOS, U.S. could still be outvoted in CLCS decisions but then be obligated to abide by the ruling
- Both Canada and Russia have passed legislation restricting transit rights to Arctic routes, U.S. participation in UNCLOS discussions will be key to resolving this standof
- Bilateral treaties are not a sufficient substitute for UNCLOS regime in settling Arctic disputes
- Bilateral treaty with Mexico to develop oil resources in Gulf of Mexico disproves argument that companies won't invest without stability provided by UNCLOS
- Bilateral relations between U.S. and Russia will be more important to Arctic security than U.S. non-party status to UNCLOS
- Bilateral agreements are problematic for addressing Arctic disputes for a number of legal reasons
- Bilateral investment treaties between Arctic coastal parties could accomplish much of what UNCLOS is trying to do
- Beijing's commitment to rejecting decision in South China Sea not likely to be swayed by U.S. accession to UNCLOS