Evidence: Alphabetical
- Even if ISA gives money to national liberation movements, U.S. could exercise its permanent veto to stop it
- Even routine off-shore oil extraction can be devastating in Arctic
- Even as a non-party to UNCLOS, US navigational rights have been protected for decades through customary international law
- Empirically, disruption of undersea cables cost millions of dollars an hour in lost revenue
- Even proponents of Law of Sea acknowledge ambiguity of 'military activities' clause could lead tribunal to rule against U.S. military
- Even within EEZ, uncertainty over rights provided by customary international law as opposed to UNCLOS is stymieing offshore wind power development
- Empirically, US companies have leased and developed oil development claims on ECS since 2001 without needing UNCLOS framework
- Entrepreneurs likely to be deterred from investing in technology and research necessary for deep seabed mining by excessive royalties requirements
- Empirically, ISA has operated in a way that belies claims of it being an overly bureaucratic and bloated agency
- Even without ratification, UNCLOS has already achieved binding customary international law status in the US
- Effectiveness of PSI would be significantly improved by US accession to UNCLOS
- Environmental groups support UNCLOS because of treaty protections for the Arctic environment
- Environmentalists anxious to use UNCLOS to sue U.S. government over environmental damage
- Establishing clear maritime boundaries and dispute resolution mechanisms will become more critical as search for resources expands out into the sea
- Empirically, UNCLOS has been no more effective than customary international law at reducing excessive claims and maritime conflict
- Excessive baseline and EEZ claims by coastal nations through UNCLOS are contributing as much instability as stability
- Existing treaties that laid the foundation for UNCLOS have been empirically obeyed by most parties
- Existing security framework and economic incentives likely to defuse any conflict in the Arctic
- Existing legal framework is more than adequate to govern Arctic disputes
- Even with amendments, 1994 agreement still puts sensitive military technology at risk of transfer
- Existing export control mechanisms are not sufficient to prevent tech transfer provisions in UNCLOS from being abused
- Exhaustive review concluded that U.S. could prevent UNCLOS tribunals from adverse rulings on U.S. military
- Empirically, China has used the technology transfer provisions under UNCLOS to acquire military technology
- Existing customary international law and practices provides flexibility U.S. needs to defend against maritime terrorism
- Environmental activists could use treaty provisions to sue U.S. for action under treaty
- Existing Arctic regime, including UNCLOS, does not provide enough legal certainty and stability for business interests
- Existing institutions are strong enough to keep Arctic stable despite border and resource disputes
- Establishing cooperative relationship in Arctic through UNCLOS has potential to strengthen cooperation between U.S. and Russia
- Every assessment from U.S. military and intelligence leaders has supported ratification of UNCLOS as in the national interest of the U.S.
- Economic output of many countries now dependent on traffic from underseas cables
- Even after South China Sea ruling, U.S. still best served by ratification of UNCLOS to preserve rights to continental shelf