Evidence: Alphabetical
- Top officials agree that UNCLOS would in no way constrain U.S. military or intelligence efforts
- Top defense officials including all current and former Chief of Naval Operations support ratification of UNCLOS
- Treaty modifications in 1994 addressed national security concerns over technology transfer provisions
- Telecommunications industry supports the treaty because of its valuable support for underseas cables
- The 1994 agreement explicitly resolved issues that Reagan administration had with UNCLOS
- The 1994 agreement resolved U.S. concerns over deep seabed mining
- Thorough review of dispute resolution and military activities concern under Bush Administration concluded that it was unlikely to be a threat
- The "peaceful purposes" clause in UNCLOS has no practical effect on U.S. military
- The United States' permanent seat on ISA does not amount for much without veto power
- Technology to mine deep seabed similar enough to offshore oil development to not present technical barrier
- Technology transfer provisions of UNCLOS could be used to acquire militarily significant dual-use technologies
- Two decades of widespread UNCLOS observance in Arctic have given treaty status of binding customary international law
- Testimony from international naval commanders affirms that U.S. absence from UNCLOS framework is undermining its ability to shape the international maritime order
- The 1995 "Turbot war" between Spain and Canada could have been resolved with US participation in UNCLOS
- The Bering Sea "Donut Hole" convention to resolve overfishing disputes was based on and supported by UNCLOS
- Traditionally conservative groups in U.S. are beginning to see more gain to U.S. from ratification of UNCLOS than remaining outside
- Twenty six nations are using UNCLOS to justify excessive EEZ claims and U.S. accession won't change their minds
- Trillions of dollars of natural resources waiting to be developed in the Arctic
- The 1994 agreement removed the most odious parts of UNCLOS related to management of the deep seabed
- Technology transfers have been eliminated from the treaty and military sensitive technology was never at risk
- Technology transfer provisions represent a substantial windfall for our adversaries and one they will surely exploit
- Tribunals setup by UNCLOS would have excessive power over U.S. Navy
- The Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent clarifies U.S. position on jurisdiction over U.S. military activities
- Technology transfer provisions remain in UNCLOS and will act as a deterrent to further research and investment
- The U.S. actively protects its freedom of navigation rights through the Freedom of Navigation program
- There is a real human cost to trying to enforce navigational rights through the freedom of navigation program as well as political and economic costs
- Terrorists could easily attack global economy by damaging submarine cables at well-known chokepoints
- Technology transfer is no longer a threat to U.S. corporations but the loss of competitiveness from remaining outside of UNCLOS is
- Trading cooperation on North Korea over South China Seas is a bad bargain for the United States as China has little incentive to cooperate
- The law of the sea is an important achievement in establishing an international rule of law