Evidence: Alphabetical
- U.S. has already committed to UNCLOS framework in Arctic by signing 2008 Illulissat Declaration but will remain outside of conversation until party to UNCLOS
- U.S. carefully negotiated and won key concessions in framing of UNCLOS to maximally protect freedom of navigation rights
- U.S. credibility on multilateral negotiations over South China Sea constrained by not being party to UNCLOS
- U.S. sovereignty has more to lose by not being party to the treaty
- U.S. accession to UNCLOS is key to the multilateral framework needed to constrain China
- U.S. rejection of international agreements like UNCLOS only emboldens our adversaries to challenge our leadership
- U..S. does not forfeit its sovereignty by signing on to the convention
- UNCLOS is not a transfer of either wealth or technology but a gain of resource jurisdiction the size of the Louisiana Purchase
- UNCLOS does not create new U.N. bureaucracy or turn oceans over to U.N.
- U.S. failure to ratify UNCLOS complicates U.S. efforts to get other nations to cooperate on anti-piracy initiatives
- U.S. ratification of UNCLOS is key to protecting existing counter-piracy operations
- U.S. failure to ratify UNCLOS will leave U.S. commercial mining and energy interests without legal protection
- U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would reduce U.S. dependency on on foreign supplies of rare earth elements
- U.S. excluded from discussions on future of Arctic because dispute resolution is governed by UNCLOS framework
- U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would help mitigate tensions in South China Sea
- U.S. can pressure China within framework of UNCLOS only if it is party to the treaty
- U.S. non-participation in UNCLOS has tangible costs to our national security
- U.S. has permanent veto over new amendments to the treaty but only after it has ratified it
- U.S. accession to UNCLOS necessary for success of the Proliferation Security Initiative
- UNCLOS, like most international law, is imperfect and constantly evolving which is why U.S. needs to be engaged to direct it
- U.S. has made a claim for the Arctic Seacap but as a non-party to UNCLOS, it has limited capacity to defend it
- UNCLOS convention already forms basis for international maritime law but U.S. is left out of discussion on its direction
- UNCLOS would create new international authority for a massive and unprecedented transfer of wealth
- UNCLOS bureaucracy would redistribute money to dictatorships and be managed by corrupt and unaccountable U.N.
- UNCLOS obligates parties to address marine pollution, many provisions of which were taking from previous 1996 convention on Fishing and Conversation
- U.S. has already agreed to limiting the continental shelf in 1964 Convention
- U.S. already bound by "Common Heritage of Mankind" principle through customary international law
- U.S. ratification of UNCLOS can be justified on military, commercial, and environmental grounds
- U.S. losing out on race for rare earth minerals from deep seabed
- U.S. has unique reserved seat on International Seabed Authority but only if it ratifies treaty
- UNCLOS supports military flexibility and U.S. is free to leave if it doesn't
- U.S. has limited time to ratify convention to secure access to Arctic resources
- UNCLOS supports all six core competencies of the U.S. Navy
- U.S. reluctance to join UNCLOS directly harms efficacy of Proliferation Security Initiative
- U.S. is unable to participate in or help shape the work of the CLCS as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. will be bound by UNCLOS provisions on interdiction regardless through customary international law without being able to guide the discussion