Existing export control mechanisms are not sufficient to prevent tech transfer provisions in UNCLOS from being abused
There is a common misperception that existing national security export control mechanisms will act as a safety net to ensure that the treaty will not serve as a conduit for militarily critical technology to be exported to potential adversaries. Unfortunately, the "stovepiped" nature of many government policy actions masks the fact that the Clinton administration has virtually eviscerated the export control process within the U.S. government and has dismantled the international regulatory mechanism as well (Leitner, 1995). There is no longer a reliable safety net to prevent foreign military or intelligence services from using the treaty as a cover to acquire highly strategic state-of-the-art technology that may be used to enhance power projection or regional destabilization activities.
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Although the 1994 treaty modifications have toned down some of the most direct mandatory technology transfer requirements, the treaty still places at risk some very sensitive, and militarily useful, technology which may readily be misused by the navies of ocean mining states.
Keywords:Related Quotes:- Pernicious effect of technology transfer provision still in effect even after 1994 agreement
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- Technology transfer provisions of UNCLOS could be used to acquire militarily significant dual-use technologies
- Even with amendments, 1994 agreement still puts sensitive military technology at risk of transfer
- ... and 7 more quote(s)
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