US advice and consent resolution regarding UNCLOS already excludes military activities from third party arbitration
Furthermore, the United States has indicated that it may broadly construe the scope of the military activities exception. The U.S. State Department takes the position "that intelligence activities at sea are military activities for purposes of the U.S. dispute settlement exclusion under the Convention and thus the binding dispute settlement procedures would not apply to U.S. intelligence activities at sea."54 The Advice and Consent Resolution also includes an understanding providing that a U.S. military vessel's collection of "military survey data" is a "military activity."55 Hypothetical situations in which U.S. views concerning the scope of "military activities" might differ from the views of international judges or arbitrators are not difficult to imagine. For example, consider a case in which a coastal state challenged the collection in its EEZ of "military survey data" by a U.S. military vessel. Would an international tribunal accept the U.S. assertion that this data collection was a "military activity"? Or would the tribunal instead characterize a dispute over such data collection as one involving coastal state restrictions on the conduct of marine scientific research? Is military deployment of a listening or security device on a coastal state's continental shelf a "military activity" (likely the U.S. view), or would this deployment fall within the scope of the coastal state's control over installations on the continental shelf (under Article 60(1)(c) of the Convention)? The self- judging U.S. "military activities" condition in the Advice and Consent Resolution suggests that the United States desires to preserve its flexibility not to participate in certain third-party proceedings, and that the United States may well regard with great skepticism any attempt to proceed with a case that the United States deems to concern military activities. U.S. State Department and Department of Defense officials, along with military leaders, have stressed the importance ofthis "military activities" condition.
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Arguments
Related argument(s) where this quote is used.
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Some opponents of UNCLOS have argued that by ratifying UNCLOS, U.S. military forces could be subject to adverse ruling by international tribunals through the dispute resolution mechanisms of the treaty. However, the U.S. defense department has reviewed the relevant law and has found no undue liability risk to U.S. forces. Furthermore, in the Senate's Advice and Consent resolution that would ratify UNCLOS, the U.S. has taken advantage of article 298(1) in UNCLOS to exempt itself from all dispute settlement.
Keywords:Related Quotes:- US advice and consent resolution regarding UNCLOS already excludes military activities from third party arbitration
- On balance the U.S should welcome the dispute resolution mechanisms in the treaty
- U.S. can issue signing statement upon ratifying UNCLOS that clarifies to interpretation of the military activities exemption
- U.S. can exempt its military activities from dispute resolution tribunals
- ... and 10 more quote(s)
Supporting Arguments: -
The United States, as authorized by Article 298, would exempt “military activities” from compulsory dispute resolution. Under the Convention, a state party has the exclusive right to determine what constitutes a “military activity.” The U.S. declaration states:
Keywords:Related Quotes:- US has made clear numerous times that military activities including intelligence gathering would not be subject to dispute resolution
- Article 310 of UNCLOS allows ratifying parties to submit signing statements to clarify their intent
- U.S. signing statements for UNCLOS outlined and clarified seven critical issues for U.S. support
- In prepared signing statements, U.S. has declared an exemption for its military activities from compulsory dispute resolution
- ... and 14 more quote(s)