Evidence: Alphabetical
- U.S. needs to bolster international law to constrain Russia in the Arctic
- U.S. is running out of time to ratify UNCLOS and submit a claim to CLCS for extended continental shelf in the Arctic
- U.S. next-generation military technology is dependent on steady supply of rare-earth metals
- U.S. could still be bound by UNCLOS law even if it hasn't ratified the treaty
- UNCLOS environmental provisions do not make sense anymore with the new threat of global terrorism
- UNCLOS would gut ability of U.S. to conduct maritime interdiction operations like the Proliferation Security Initiative
- U.S. should be concerned that UNCLOS would give U.N. a greater license for theft and corruption
- UNCLOS would prevent U.S. from responding to threats of environmental terrorism by restricting maritime interdiction operations
- U.S. cannot protect its interests in the Arctic without ratifying UNCLOS
- U.S. should ratify UNCLOS to protect U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic
- U.S. cannot effectively engage in discussions on the future of the Arctic as a non-party to UNCLOS
- UNCLOS ratification is the only way U.S. can preserve sovereignty in Arctic
- UNCLOS has widespread support in the military, diplomatic, and intelligence communities
- U.S. has good reasons for its limited attention to Arctic politics to date
- U.S. is far behind other states in developing economic development plan for the Arctic
- U.S. absence from UNCLOS puts it at a disadvantage when considering resource management solutions necessary for resolution of South China Seas disputes
- U.S. could more effectively advocate for and defend freedom of navigation rights as a party to UNCLOS
- U.S. can better advocate for freedom of navigation in South China Sea as a party to UNCLOS
- U.S. ability to advocate for joint development solution to South China Sea dispute hampered by its non-party status to UNCLOS
- Underseas cables will increasingly become a target for terrorists
- U.S. should ratify UNCLOS to help convince other states to implement necessary protections for underseas cables
- U.S. has traditionally seen the benefit of participating in third-party dispute settlment
- U.S. accession to UNCLOS would greatly improve our ability to advocate for international rule of law
- Upon ratification, U.S. will accrue numerous opportunities to regain its maritime leadership role within UNCLOS
- U.S. sees low level of military threat from disputes in Arctic
- U.S. unable to be a credible champion for international rule of law with China as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. unable to resolve dispute with China over military ships operating in foreign EEZs as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. would have stronger ground to challenge China's "Nine-Dashed Line" and push for multilateral solutions as a party to UNCLOS
- U.S. has made clear that in signing UNCLOS it would reserve the right to determine which of its activities are military activities
- U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly affirmed value of freedom of navigation program
- U.S. should not make ratifying UNCLOS a precondition for challenging China on SCS dispute
- U.S. interests in China's excessive claims have broader impact on navigation rights than just in South China Seas
- U.S. participation in UNCLOS key to strengthening environmental protections for Arctic region
- U.S. military leadership has carefully examined the implications of UNCLOS and have endorsed ratification
- U.S. rights to develop in the Arctic only come into conflict with Russia and Canada and existing bilateral arrangements are sufficient to manage these disputes
- UNCLOS ITLOS tribunal has applied precautionary principle before in Southern Bluefin Tuna Case