Arguments: Most Active
Under the convention, the United States assumes a number of obligations at odds with its military practices and national security interests, including a commitment not to collect intelligence. The U.S. would sign away its ability to collect intelligence vital for American security within the “territorial waters” of any other country (Article 19). Further- more, U.S. submarines would be required to travel on the surface and show their flags while sailing within territorial waters (Article 20).
- UNCLOS would complicate intelligence operations by facilitating seizure of U.S. assets
- Impossible for proponents of UNCLOS to have high confidence that UNCLOS won't restrict US intelligence operations
- U.S. participation in UNCLOS would undermine military and intelligence operations
- Article 19 or the "Pueblo clause" would devastate U.S. intelligence operations
- Article 20 provisions will negative impact ability of military to use underwater drones
The U.S. is currently tracking dozens of excessive claims by states, some of which are from states seeking to take advantage of perceived U.S. weakness due to its non-party status to UNCLOS. Regardless, the U.S. would be in a better position to contest these claims (and dissuade further claims) as a party to UNCLOS.
- China and Iran challenging U.S. operations because of its non-party status to UNCLOS
- U.S. lacks standing to challenge Iranian and Chinese excessive claims as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. ability to challenge excessive claims weakened by its non-party status to UNCLOS
- UNCLOS would help protect U.S. naval freedoms against growing number of excessive claims
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Even though U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, it still has committed itself to abiding by its principles in two ways: through numerous policy statements and laws drafted in accordance with UNCLOS and committing the U.S. to abiding by it; and due to the fact that the Law of the Sea has become customary international law.
- Even without ratification, UNCLOS has already achieved binding customary international law status in the US
- U.S. has committed to abiding by UNCLOS framework in the Arctic both formally and informally
- Despite U.S. non-party status to UNCLOS, all three branches of government have already accepted it as law of the land
- US already acts according to the convention without accruing its benefits -- it is time for US to resume leadership role
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By ratifying the Convention, the U.S. will have the support of the international community to exert pressure on China—either for peaceful dispute resolution or to adhere to the provisions of the Convention that it too has ratified.
- Convention offers diplomatic mechanism to resolve maritime disputes with China
- China's aggressive maritime posture is a consequence of U.S. failure of leadership on UNCLOS
- China using U.S. non-party status to UNCLOS to bludgeon it for hypocrisy when U.S. challenges China's excessive claims
- US shaping operations in Asia Pacific region would be greatly enhanced by US accession to UNCLOS
- Ratification of UNCLOS gives U.S. more ground to challenge China on freedom of navigation rights in South China Sea
- U.S. unable to resolve dispute with China over military ships operating in foreign EEZs as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. stance on FONOPs in China's territorial waters undercut by its non-party status to UNCLOS
U.S. capability to influence China would be strengthened by a reassertion of the American leadership role over the development of international law of the sea. Since UNCLOS is the basis of modern international law of the sea, the U.S. should ratify the Convention in order to more effectively exercise this leadership from within the ranks, not just from outside them.
- U.S. can best demonstrate rule of law leadership by ratifying the Law of the Sea
- U.S. credibility in the Asia Pacific region is dependent on its ratification of UNCLOS
- UNCLOS is having a normative effect on shaping China's laws and behavior
- Ratifying UNCLOS would give US ability to credibly demand nations abide by rules in South China Sea
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The area of resource jurisdiction the U.S. would gain legal status to by ratifying the treaty is approximately equal to that of the continental United States and exceeds the area of the Louisiana Purchase, the purchase of Alaska or any other addition to U.S. sovereignty in history.
- U.S. can extend sovereignty by 200,000 square miles by ratifying UNCLOS
- U.S. gain in sovereignty over territory is greatest among all parties due to its extensive coastlines
- US accession to UNCLOS would greatly increase territory under its sovereign control
- UNCLOS is not a transfer of either wealth or technology but a gain of resource jurisdiction the size of the Louisiana Purchase
- UNCLOS expands U.S. sovereignty by 4.1 million miles
The U.S. can exercise its rights under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to assert that it is permitted to mine and navigate in its Extended Continental Shelf. Ratifying UNCLOS would constrict the ability of the U.S. to respond to challenges to these rights by forcing all further negotiation to occur through the CLCS.
- U.S. should assert its rights to develop in the Arctic by invoking the existing convention on the high seas
- US can still legally assert a claim in the Arctic without being party to UNCLOS
- U.S. scuttling of Russia's initial Arctic claim shows it can still influence CLCS as a non member
- US successful experience with challenging Russia's claim shows that even as a non party to UNCLOS the US is not a helpless bystander to CLCS
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According to U.S. foreign relations law, the United States may engage in deep seabed mining activities even if it does not accede to UNCLOS, provided that such activities are conducted without claiming sovereignty over any part of the deep seabed and as long as the mining activities are conducted with due regard to the rights of other nations to engage in mining.This position is also reflected in the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980.
- US companies could still mine deep seabed outside UNCLOS by going through foreign subsidiaries
- US ocean policy already allows development of deep seabed mingling resources within US EEZ
- Under 1980 DSMHRA Act, US citizens and corporations are fee to mine deep seabed regardless of whether US is party to UNCLOS
- An informal, non-UNCLOS, multilateral organization would be sufficient to protect U.S. interests in mining deep seabed
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The United States cannot currently participate in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which oversees ocean delineation on the outer limits of the extended continental shelf (outer continental shelf). Even though it is collecting scientific evidence to support eventual claims off its Atlantic, Gulf, and Alaskan coasts, the United States, without becoming party to the convention, has no standing in the CLCS.
- Assertions of legal rights to arctic resources have dubious legal standing while us remains outside of UNCLOS
- US will have no capacity to challenge CLCS claims unless it is a full member of UNCLOS
- Seat on CLCS council valuable in that it allows US to take part in discussions and engage other participants
- By remaining outside of convention, US is unable to engage in disputes over Arctic claims within framework
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The United States can successfully pursue its national interests regarding its extended continental shelf by negotiating on a bilateral basis with nations with which it shares maritime borders to delimit and mutually recognize each other’s maritime and ECS boundaries.
- US could rely on reciprocal bilateral treaties as proposed in 1980 DSHMRA act as an alternative to UNCLOS
- US can resolve territorial disputes with each nation bilaterally without being party to UNCLOS
- US actively surveying extended continental shelf and can negotiate bilateral agreements with nations regarding boundaries outside UNCLOS framework
- US can negotiate bilateral agreements with nations that share maritime borders to delimit ECS borders outside of UNCLOS framework
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