U.S. ratification of UNCLOS key to development of deep seabed mining industry
The development of deep seabed claims is incredibly expensive. Companies in the U.S. are reluctant to invest heavily in deep seabed mining because of the risk that their activities would not withstand a legal challenge since the U.S. is not a party to the Convention. Conversely, foreign companies, because their governments have joined the Convention, have access to the international bodies that grant the legal claims to operate in the deep seabed area. The U.S. cannot represent the interests of its companies in those bodies.
Quicktabs: Arguments
Lockheed Martin, the only U.S. company with active claims to deep seabed sites under a U.S. law predating the Law of the Sea Convention, recently wrote to this Committee urging the Senate to approve the Convention. Lockheed has invested hundreds of millions of dollars on research and development related to deep seabed mining over the past 40 years. The company’s letter made clear that the multibillion dollar investments now required to launch an ocean-based resource development business will only occur if it can obtain the security of tenure and clear legal rights offered under the Convention. With Lockheed and potentially other U.S. companies poised to expand their operations and create new jobs, Senate accession to this treaty would allow investor dollars to stay here.
Equally important to U.S. companies contemplating deep seabed mining activities is U.S. leadership in the ISA. The next several years will be formative for the nascent deep seabed mining industry. As I mentioned earlier, the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime was overhauled in 1994, resulting in a system that is uniquely favorable to American interests. Those reforms included a permanent U.S. seat on the Council of the ISA. But the U.S. has not assumed that seat, and cannot guide the development of new rules pertinent to deep seabed mining activities while outside the Convention.
Lockheed Martin, a U.S. based company, has been a large proponent of recognizing the need for the ISA.120 In June 2012, the chairman of Lockheed Martin sent a letter to the U.S. Senate stating, “[Lockheed Martin] wanted to join the race for undersea riches, but could not assume investment risks until it was clear that it would have a clear legal title to its findings.”121 Lockheed Martin stated it is unwilling to do so absent U.S. ratification of UNCLOS.122
Lockheed Martin also participated in a 2012 movement known as The American Sovereignty Campaign, which was comprised of members from the government and private sector.123 The campaign’s goal was to send Congress a message: that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would “invite economic opportunity, create U.S. jobs, and protect business and commercial interests at home and abroad.”124 Lockheed Martin is the only U.S. based holder of exploration licenses granted by the ISA.125 Jennifer Warren, Vice President of Lockheed Martin stated, “business initiatives to exploit deep seabed mineral resources will only be able to secure the necessary financial investments if done pursuant to the existing international framework,” referring to the legal structure created by the ISA and UNCLOS.126
Moreover, mining companies much prefer the known difficulties of operating on land to those of operating on the seabed. The risks of working in a place where volcanic activity seems to have stopped but may suddenly resume are uncertain. So indeed are the possible obligations to repair the underwater environment: no legal codes are yet in place for deep-sea mining. That helps to explain why the only places in which companies have dipped more than a toe in the water are in exclusive economic zones, which are not just shallower than many parts of the distant ocean but also within the legal ambit of a national authority.
Seafloor mining beyond countries' territorial waters is regulated by the International Seabed Authority, set up under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. So far it has issued only eight licences, all for exploration, not production, all for nodules, not massive-sulphide deposits, and all to governmental or quasi-governmental agencies (of China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and an east European consortium). No wonder. Commercial miners want both a clear title to their holding and exclusive rights to exploit it. They also have to answer to shareholders.
The taxation objection made by opponents is often coupled with an argument that US companies that had invested millions of dollars in exploration costs would lose their existing claims under US law. This argument ignores the fact that the 1994 Agreement grandfathers these holders into the treaty regime based on arrangements no less favorable than those granted to holders of claims already registered with the Authority upon certification by the US government and the payment of a $250,000 application fee (a fee that is half of the fee established in the 1982 Convention). As Ambassador Colson pointed out in the 1994 hearings, "If the U.S. does not become Party to the Convention, international recognition of the rights of the U.S. licensed consortia could be jeopardized."
There are many misconceptions as to what the signing of UNCLOS would mean for the United States and deep seabed mining. It is argued that by ratifying UNCLOS, including the Agreement, states will inevitably have to discontinue their unilateral attempts at deep seabed mining.133 However, this is unfounded as the law of the deep seabed was intentionally not settled in order to produce solid negotiations of the sort that resulted in UNCLOS.134 Most, if not all, of the potential deep seabed mining nations are dedicated to the adoption of UNCLOS and the Agreement.135 The potential deep seabed mining countries understand that there is a lack of economic viability in the present deep seabed mining industry, and "it is inconceivable that the necessary financial markets would support unilateral mining if it is contrary to the principles" of UNCLOS.
And it’s not just about oil and gas. Rare-earth metals are compounds integral to the production of modern devices including cell phones, hybrid cars, and even precision-guided missile systems. Currently more than 95 percent of rare-earth metals are produced in China, which has begun restricting its export.
But nodules found on the deep seabed—well outside even extended continental shelves—have “economically significant” amounts of rare-earth metals, and Lockheed Martin and other companies would like to begin exploration to determine the viability of tapping this source. Access to these areas that are beyond any national claim of jurisdiction will have to be regulated by an international body—in this case, the ISA—which explains Lockheed Martin’s support for U.S. ratification of the Law of the Sea.
The United States has a clear choice: Agree to limited revenue sharing under the treaty and bankroll more than 93 percent of total revenue from extended continental shelf and high seas activities, or get nothing at all and lose the ability to challenge claims made by other nations.
Until a decade ago, the United States was 100 percent self-reliant for rare earth production, with domestic companies producing enough to supply U.S. manufacturers. Over time, however, U.S. production was halted as it became economically and environmentally cost prohibitive.
Companies in various countries – including the United States – are looking at reopening closed mines and developing new deposits, but these efforts could take a number of years to fully come on line.
The deep seabed offers a new opportunity for the United States to gain steady access to these vital rare earth minerals. Polymetallic nodules are located on the deep ocean floor. These nodules typically contain manganese, nickel, copper, cobalt and rare earth minerals. However, U.S. companies cannot actively pursue claims in the areas where these nodules are dense unless the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Treaty.
The Law of the Sea Convention provides the only internationally recognized legal regime for extracting mineral resources from the ocean floor in the deep seabed, an area over which no country has sovereign rights. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) develops the rules, regulations and procedures relating to the deep seabed. The Convention guarantees the United States, and only the United States, a permanent seat on the decision-making Council of the ISA – with an effective veto over decisions impacting U.S. interests.
The development of deep seabed claims is incredibly expensive. Companies in the U.S. are reluctant to invest heavily in deep seabed mining because of the risk that their activities would not withstand a legal challenge since the U.S. is not a party to the Convention. Conversely, foreign companies, because their governments have joined the Convention, have access to the international bodies that grant the legal claims to operate in the deep seabed area. The U.S. cannot represent the interests of its companies in those bodies.
Lockheed Martin, for example, has two deep seabed claims that pre-date the Law of the Sea Convention. It has continued to extend its licenses through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These claims will be instantly recognized by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) if the U.S. joins the Convention. However, without the U.S. becoming a party to the Convention, Lockheed Martin is unable to secure U.S. sponsorship of these claims at the ISA.
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After a lengthy pandemic pause, the International Seabed Authority is set to debate mining regulations but the U.S. is sidelined in the discussions as a non-party to UNCLOS.
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