Most of the solutions that have been put forward by scholars focus on the structural security issues alone and what governments must do to secure this vital infrastructure. Douglas Burnett argues that governments should follow the lead of Australia and Singapore and coordinate a single point of contact for undersea cable issues.¹⁰⁶ He suggests that the U.S. Navy should reach out to naval allies such as Canada and France as well as to cable industry representatives and together develop cable-protection strategies that enable the navy to respond quickly to pirate and terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁷ Commander Michael Matis of the U.S. Navy recommends creating a new international cable construction regulatory regime that would promote greater international cooperation and information sharing.¹⁰⁸ As part of that effort, he urges the United States to immediately ratify UNCLOS and encourages UNCLOS members to collectively update their legislation to protect cables and make it an international crime to tamper with them.¹⁰⁹ These scholars understand that any action to increase the safety of undersea cables must be international. Models have shown that a cable break off the coasts of Marseille could have detrimental effects on data flow in and out of India.¹¹⁰ In other words, merely increasing security in one's own waters will not be sufficient. Any security strategy must be global in scope.

Perhaps even more troubling than the above-mentioned structural vulnerability of undersea cables is the lack of security efforts and criminal sanctions by governments to protect undersea cables and deter future attacks. U.S. National Intelligence director James Clapper recently testified that cyber attacks, (by which he meant purely digital attacks like computer worms or viruses that can shut down the electrical grid or financial markets),⁶⁹ are the nation's number one security priority.⁷⁰ Clapper highlighted how much governments, utilities, and financial services rely on the Internet and therefore are vulnerable to cyber attack.⁷¹ Yet at the same time, protection of undersea cables (a critical infrastructure that supports the Internet) from physical attacks is sorely lacking. For example, in the United States, the willful destruction of an international submarine cable is punishable by a maximum of two years in prison and a mere $5,000 fine.⁷² This fine is hardly a deterrent, and is far out of proportion to the damage that such an act would cause. Furthermore, the United States has not joined the 162 countries that have signed onto the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁷³ As a result, there are no UNCLOS security protections for U.S. undersea cables outside of U.S. waters.⁷⁴ Only Australia and Singapore have created a single point of contact within their governments to address issues of undersea cable security and to coordinate with cable owners to combat hostile actions.⁷⁵ On a worldwide level, no organization is responsible for undersea cables and there have been no international tests of cable defense systems.⁷⁶ The maintenance and security of the cables is left to private trade organizations.⁷⁷ Given the extent to which governments themselves rely on these cables,⁷⁸ the current lack of a coherent undersea cable security strategy by governments must be remedied. The infrastructure itself is vulnerable, and governments like the United States are not yet taking adequate actions to protect it. It is not enough for governments like the United States to focus on digital attacks on Internet systems. They must also take action to protect the physical structure of the Internet.⁷⁹

Submarine infrastructure is already vulnerable to attack and will become even more so in the coming years, especially as undersea vehicles grow more advanced and accessible. Unprotected cables and energy infrastructure could provide adversaries with all kinds of opportunities to gain the upper hand. Hostile forces could, for instance, plant explosive charges in sensitive locations and threaten to pull the trigger. Or they could set off explosions without warning, throwing markets into chaos and disrupting military command-and-control systems. State and nonstate actors could conduct anonymous attacks or act under a false flag. Attributing responsibility for a covert attack would prove challenging, making deterrence extremely difficult. Such moves wouldn’t be unprecedented, of course: before undersea fiber optics dominated global communications, cable cutting was a regular part of warfare. In 1914, the United Kingdom severed all five of Germany’s undersea cables in the English Channel the day after declaring war, and belligerents regularly snipped enemy cables during World War II. But today, it would be more difficult to sever fiber-optic lines without affecting a much larger and more interdependent system—making a potential attack all the more damaging.

At present for the United States, the operative international treaty for international cables is the 1884 International Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables. This venerable treaty was designed for old international telegraph cables. While most of its features are included in UNCLOS, UNCLOS provides real improvements required by the steady progress made in international communications in the past 122 years since the 1884 treaty entered into force. UNLCOS is essential for modern telecom business.

For example, under the 1884 treaty, nations are required to provide criminal and civil sanctions for negligent or intentional actions which cause injury to a submarine telegraph cable. Unfortunately, under this treaty, the cable owner must wait until the damage is done before sanctions are triggered. Under UNCLOS, conduct which is likely to result in injury can also be sanctioned. Under UNCLOS, a cable owner has a remedy to prevent the injury to critical infrastructure in the first place. When one considers the average $1M plus cost of a cable repair and the potential disruption a cable break can cause to vital economic and strategic interests, it is easy to see why cable owners want UNCLOS now.

The 1884 treaty is limited to telegraph cables. UNCLOS provides and expands the protections accorded telegraph cables to all international cables regardless of use.