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By remaining outside of UNCLOS, the U.S. is ceding its leadership role in the region in a number of ways. First, and most importantly for the U.S. strategic and economic interests, by remaining outside of the treaty the U.S. is not able to submit its claims for the extended continental shelf in the Arctic to the CLCS, preventing U.S. industries from claiming mineral rights. Secondly, existing Arctic governance regimes are based on and rely on UNCLOS and the U.S. non-party status prevents it from contributing as a full partner, weakening the overall Arctic governance regime. Finally, U.S.
- U.S. is being left behind in race for the Arctic as a non-party to UNCLOS
- U.S. has limited time to ratify convention to secure access to Arctic resources
- U.S. national interest harmed by remaining outside UNCLOS regime and unable to take advantage of Arctic boom
- U.S. should make ratification of UNCLOS a top priority to ensure it doesn't lose out on opening of Arctic
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- U.S. has significant interests in untapped mineral wealth in Arctic
- Other nations are pursuing Arctic claims to the detriment of the U.S.
- U.S. failure to ratify UNCLOS complicates U.S. naval operations in the Arctic
- UNCLOS is best regime for Arctic Governance
- U.S. can't secure claims to Arctic resources through CLCS as a non-party to UNCLOS
- Russia poses a strategic threat to the U.S. in the Arctic
The U.S. can exercise its rights under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to assert that it is permitted to mine and navigate in its Extended Continental Shelf. Ratifying UNCLOS would constrict the ability of the U.S. to respond to challenges to these rights by forcing all further negotiation to occur through the CLCS.
- U.S. should assert its rights to develop in the Arctic by invoking the existing convention on the high seas
- US can still legally assert a claim in the Arctic without being party to UNCLOS
- U.S. scuttling of Russia's initial Arctic claim shows it can still influence CLCS as a non member
- US successful experience with challenging Russia's claim shows that even as a non party to UNCLOS the US is not a helpless bystander to CLCS
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According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic region is the largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on earth with an estimated ninety billion barrels of undiscovered oil reserves, and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In addition, the unpredictability of the Persian Gulf region makes the Arctic region even more attractive for exploitation.
- U.S. has significant economic interest in Arctic oil reserves
- Warm arctic will increase availability of key resources including minerals and oil
- U.S. access to Arctic mineral and oil wealth depends on accession to UNCLOS
- Trillions of dollars of natural resources waiting to be developed in the Arctic
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By ratifying UNCLOS, the United States would be submitting itself to a much wider range of international controls than it has in the past and would give more power and legitimacy to misguided efforts to establish a supra-national government at the United Nations.
- Regulatory reach of UNCLOS could be unconstrained given the interconnected nature of the ocean ecosystem
- ISA will promulgate regulations on nations outside of U.S. control
- Regulatory activism from ISA would stifle innovation and entrepreneurship
- Ratification of UNCLOS would allow regulators to run rampant, reaching far into all economic sectors
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By remaining outside the Convention, the United States makes it more difficult for U.S. naval forces to have maximum operating flexibility in the Arctic and complicates negotiations with maritime partners for coordinated search and rescue operations in the region. The ability of U.S. naval forces to carry out their missions would be assisted if the United States were to ratify UNCLOS.
There is considerable debate currently on how UNCLOS can govern marine genetic resources and without consensus, patent holders cannot enjoy the protections necessary in the global marketplace to spur continued investment in genetic resources. The U.S., as a non-party to UNCLOS, lacks standings to contribute to or lead these debates and puts its own marine biotechnology industry at a disadvantage as a result.
The United States is already a party to more than 85 agreements (most of them multilateral in nature) that provide for the resolution of disputes by the International Court of Justice. It has also already accepted the dispute resolution mechanisms in UNCLOS by ratifying the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement and the 2000 Convention on Central and Western Pacific Fisheries, both of which incorporate by reference the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention.
- Dispute resolution mechanism in UNCLOS no worse than already accepted principle of universal jurisdiction
- US has already accepted UNCLOS arbitration in two previous agreements but the Advice and Consent resolution serves to further qualify application
- Dispute resolution mechanisms in UNCLOS same as in other international agreements and do not threaten military
- Over 85 treaties U.S. is already a party to contain similar if not more restrictive dispute settlement provisions to UNCLOS
- Sovereignty costs of external dispute resolution in UNCLOS less ornnerous than provisions U.S. has already accepted
Currently the vital U.S. underseas cable industry has to rely on the outdated 1884 telegraph treaty for its legal basis when defending its rights to lay, maintain, and repair underseas cables. U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would better protect U.S. companies’ existing cable systems and foster additional investments by giving telecommunications the legal certainty to their claims that they need.
- Telecommunications industry supports the treaty because of its valuable support for underseas cables
- As a non-party to UNCLOS, U.S. can only use 1884 convention rules on telegraph cables to protect its underseas cables
- Protections for underseas cables upgraded in UNCLOS
- US telecom companies are disadvantaged in disputes over underseas cable rights by the US being a non-party to the convention
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Opponents argue that by ratifying UNCLOS, the United Nations would be given the first opportunity to tax U.S. citizens. However, this is a misunderstanding of the royalties structure within UNCLOS. The International Seabed Authority requires royalty payments from all companies engaged in seabed mining in areas that do not belong to any country and are therefore under the management of the ISA. These payments are a small fraction of the revenue and similar to payments U.S. companies already pay around the world to governments for resource concessions.
- UNCLOS stipulates modest fees on resource extraction industries but does not represent new taxing authority
- UNCLOS does not impose a tax but a royalty scheme that comes with unprecedented U.S. control over administration
- UNCLOS does not establish tax on corporations or individuals, only a modest revenue sharing agreement for mineral/energy extraction in international waters
- Royalty payments in UNCLOS are neither unique nor burdensome which is why the oil and gas industry views them as a bargain and favors UNCLOS ratification
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UNCLOS uniquely gives the United Nations the ability to impose a tax on nations by use of its royalties assessments on the exploitation of oil and gas reserves.
- UNCLOS would create taxing authority within UN for the first time, starting a dangerous precedent
- UNCLOS would establish new precedent for allowing United Nations to levy taxes that would lead to further abuses
- UNCLOS uniquely sets up an international taxing authority that is a step in the wrong direction