U.S. ratification of UNCLOS necessary to control overfishing
U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will boost efforts to manage fishing populations in multiple ways. First, UNCLOS provides a clear legal framework for resolving disputes between countries over fishing rights, as for example the disputes between the U.S. and Canada. Secondly, becoming a party to UNCLOS gives the U.S. Coast Guard more legal tools to enforce existing regulations within the U.S. EEZ. Finally, by aceeding to UNCLOS the U.S. will be able to better lead on cooperative solutions to the global problem of overfishing.
Quicktabs: Arguments
Overfishing is a tremendous problem facing the world's oceans.n320 The problem is perpetuated by individual national conservation efforts.n321 Although aimed at curbing overfishing, these programs have little effect if they apply only to one nation. n322 Fish are a resource that knows no boundaries. A limit on fishing by one nation does nothing to stop overfishing by another nation that exploits the same fishery. It also can lead to international conflict, as is evidenced by the "cod war" between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Only a joint effort by the world's largest fishing nations can bring the problem under control.
UNCLOS III is not perfect. Still, it is the strongest comprehensive environmental law agreement ever created. Its provisions dealing with fisheries conservation and management stress cooperation and coordination. The Convention also provides a framework necessary to implement conservation and dispute settlement. These provisions are essential for the world to begin to solve the overfishing problem. For example, by legitimating the EEZ and other zones of control, the Convention actually encourages nations to work together. Nations must agree on boundaries and on conservation plans.
Widespread support of UNCLOS III is necessary to control overfishing. Even widespread support, however, is not enough if large fishing nations still do not adhere to the agreement. The United States and Canada have not yet ratified the convention. Without their support, the international agreement cannot be effective.
Without venturing into the intricacies of how an RFMO for the Arctic Ocean might be established and operated, the point is that the United States, Russia, and the other Arctic states are familiar with the challenges of managing sustainable fisheries and the consequences of failing to act proactively. Furthermore, all eight Arctic states have ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement, a strong indication “that all eight states have already accepted the principles established by [UNCLOS] that includes the enforcement of regional fisheries agreements in the high seas.”92 In short, cooperation among the Arctic states, including Russia, seems more likely than conflict on fisheries issues. The real question may be whether those states allocate sufficient resources to the enforcement of whatever regime is put in place.
Not all Arctic resources are buried in the continental shelf. In the United States, fisheries and the seafood industry account for $30 billion domesti- cally, $12 billion in exports, and employ more than 100,000.38 In the southern Arctic region (Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska), they are leading employers and sustain the indigenous people.39 World-class fisheries are found in the Barents and Bering seas, the Central North Atlantic off Greenland and Iceland, and the Newfoundland and Labrador seas off the coast of northeastern Canada.40 Regulating and monitoring these stocks in the Arctic are critical economically and strategically. If not protected, the fisheries would be decimated by overfishing. The 110th Congress stated that ‘‘the United States should initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or agreements for managing migratory, trans-boundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean and establishing a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the region.’’41
The United States remains in a holding pattern. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council voted to close the Arctic to commercial fishing until it can be conducted sustainably, a management mechanism is developed, and we can implement an ecosystem-based management policy for Arctic resources.42 At some point, the United States cannot maintain this policy unilaterally and must enforce an international regime through patrolling and monitor- ing foreign fishing and fish-processing vessels in the region.
In recognizing the sovereign rights and management authority of coastal States over living resources within their EEZs, the Convention brings most fisheries under the jurisdiction of coastal States. (Some 90 percent of living marine resources are harvested within 200 nautical miles of the coast.) The Convention imposes on coastal States a duty to conserve these resources and also imposes obligations upon all States to cooperate in the conservation of fisheries populations on the high seas and of populations that are found both on the high seas and within the EEZ (highly migratory stocks, such as tuna, as well as "straddling stocks"). In addition, it contains specific measures for the conservation of anadromous species, such as salmon, and for marine mammals, such as whales. These provisions of the Convention give the United States the right to regulate fisheries in the largest EEZ in the world, an area significantly greater than U.S. land territory, which contains some of the most resource-rich waters on the planet.
UNCLOS serves as the international foundation for fisheries management, giving coastal states sovereign rights over natural resources in their EEZs, a duty to conserve and the right to utilize fish stocks, and a duty to cooperate with other countries in the management of certain fish stocks.51 The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement,52 to which the United States is a party, provides a precautionary approach to fisheries and encourages regional cooperation in management of fisheries in the high seas.53 Although UNCLOS does not provide a detailed regime through which state parties must manage fisheries, it provides a broad framework that encourages multilateral approaches to sustainable development of fish stocks.54
Another sovereignty-related issue that the Convention addresses is conservation and pollution on the seas, a pressing concern given the widespread exploitation of the sea and its resources.43 Part XII of the Convention, entitled Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, imposes upon states the “obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.”44 The Convention also includes detailed provisions that explicitly require state parties to take measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution.45 States are required to cooperate with global and regional efforts in combating pollution by setting standards, rules, and recommended practices, many of these through appropriate international organizations.46 Furthermore, the Convention requires states to take the affirmative step of implementing systems for monitoring and reporting the risks and effects of pollution to their marine environments.47
Conservation and pollution provisions are included in the 1966 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, to which the United States is also a party.48 As mentioned previously, this convention permits high seas fishing while also requiring states take steps to conserve the seas’ living resources.49
The Convention also maximizes legal certainty for United States sovereign rights over ocean resources in the largest EEZ in the world, as well as energy and mineral and other resources on our extended continental shelf. The Convention provides the mechanism to assure international recognition of additional United States sovereign rights on an extended continental shelf. Moreover, due to overfished and depleted fish populations, effective management of migratory fish stocks and fisheries will continue to be a contentious issue for the foreseeable future. The Convention is widely accepted as the legal framework under which all international fisheries are regulated and enforced. The Convention imposes responsibilities on the coastal states to manage their fishery resources responsibly and provides a process for resolving conflicts between competing users. The Coast Guard defends United States sovereign rights by protecting our precious ocean resources from poaching, unlawful incursion, and illegal exploitation. Joining the Convention places these sovereign rights on a firmer legal foundation, bolstering the Coast Guard’s continued ability to ensure our Nation’s sovereign rights are respected.
In particular, becoming a party to the Convention will give the Coast Guard greater leverage in our efforts to eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. American fishermen are currently abiding by standards contemplated by the Convention and further detailed in the related UN Fish Stocks Agreement. They are adversely affected by foreign fishermen who illegally harvest highly migratory fish stocks. In another anomalous situation, the United States is a party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which is directly related to the legal regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, even though we have not joined the underlying Convention. As a party to the Convention, we would be in a stronger position to persuade other nations to abide by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and other modern international standards of fisheries management and thus advance our Nation’s interests in this field.
As national governments debate the merits of joining UNCLOS III, international conflicts over fishing rights continue to develop throughout the world. Of particular note are: 1) disputes in the Spratly Islands of southeast Asia; 2) negotiations between Japan and South Korea over the Islets of Takeshima; 3) negotiations between China and South Korea involving shared waters; and 4) conflicts over conservation practices between Canada, Spain, and the United States. These disputes illustrate some of the issues that need to be settled to solve the overfishing problem. In each instance, agreements are being worked out in accordance with UNCLOS III. Unfortunately, although UNCLOS III provides the framework to begin resolving these disputes, a great deal of uncertainty surrounding international fishing regulation continues.n185 In many instances who has the power to dictate fishing rights and territory remains unclear.n186 In some cases, fishing practices that lead to unhealthy depletion of fish stocks continue unchecked.n187 In other instances, temporary solutions are implemented, but the future still is unknown. Widespread acceptance of UNCLOS III would provide the necessary structure to resolve these tenuous situations.
The effects of overfishing may be the most devastating in Canada.n221 As a result, Canada has made drastic decisions in an attempt to save the fish stocks. In the 1990s, the northern cod fishery off the Grand Banks near Canada collapsed.n222 Canada made the unpopular decision to close the fishery in an attempt to maintain sustainable fish stocks within its EEZ.
The decision focused attention on nations fishing the same stocks outside Canada's EEZ. The result was the socalled "turbot [cod] war," an open conflict with fishermen from outside Canada who were perceived to be contributing to the problems on the Grand Banks. In 1995, a Canadian vessel fired warning shots and impounded the "Estai," a Spanish fishing vessel operating on the Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland. In a discussion about the United States' ratification of UNCLOS III, U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell argued before the U.S. Senate that similar incidents could be avoided in the future if UNLCOS III gains widespread support:
Had Canada and Spain both been party to the Law of the Sea Convention, this dispute could have been settled without the firing of shots. Regrettably, such incidents are the result of the growing uncertainty that prevails with regard to high seas fisheries and will only be avoided if the Convention on the Law of the Sea becomes a widely recognized instrument on which ... to establish a lasting regime for those fisheries.