Revision of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS necessary to control overfishing from Sun, 06/29/2014 - 11:44
U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will boost efforts to manage fishing populations in multiple ways. First, UNCLOS provides a clear legal framework for resolving disputes between countries over fishing rights, as for example the disputes between the U.S. and Canada. Secondly, becoming a party to UNCLOS gives the U.S. Coast Guard more legal tools to enforce existing regulations within the U.S. EEZ. Finally, by aceeding to UNCLOS the U.S. will be able to better lead on cooperative solutions to the global problem of overfishing.
Quicktabs: Arguments
In another instance, Canada sparred with the United States over fishing rights. In 1994, Canada developed a plan to levy a $1100 fee on United States fishing vessels that travel along the 650mile Inside Passage from Puget Sound, Oregon and Washington to Alaska.n231 Senator Pell argued:
The State Department concluded that this transit fee was inconsistent with international law, and particularly with the transit rights guaranteed to vessels under customary international law and the Law of the Sea Convention. Had the United States and Canada both ratified the Law of the Sea Convention ... The Canadians might have been more hesitant to take the steps they did. In any event, the full force of the convention and the international community could have been brought to bear for a prompt resolution of the dispute.n232
Thus, according to Senator Pell, UNCLOS III could help the United States resolve its international conflicts over fishing.
UNCLOS III provisions played a key role in the resolution of a major conflict in the Central Bering Sea in 1994. n285 The problem arose in the mid1980s, when the vessels of several nations began to fish a stock of pollack in an area of the Central Bering Sea just outside the U.S. and Russian 200mile EEZs. n286 The fish stock was largely associated with the U.S. zone and its fisheries.n287 The international fishery grew quickly, with the annual harvest soon reaching 1.5 million metric tons or more.n288 American fishermen increasingly called on the U.S. government to control international fishing in the Central Bering Sea, also known as the "Bering Sea Donut Hole."n289 By 1991, negotiations began among the nations that used the fishery: Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Poland, and the United States.n290 These nations debated over whether the United States and Russia had a special right to the stocks.n291 The result was the "Donut Hole Convention,"n292 which has been described as a "precautionary approach to stock management."n293 Ambassador Colson has argued that UNCLOS III did not hinder the Donut Hole agreement; in fact, "the Donut Hole Convention could not have been negotiated without the framework and foundation provided by the Law of the Sea Convention."n294 Among the requirements of the Donut Hole agreement is that fishing vessels must use realtime satellite positionfixing transmitters while in the Bering Sea so nations can ensure that vessels are there only to navigate to and from the fishing ground.n295 The agreement also provides for boarding and inspection of fishing vessels by any party, and it establishes procedures to "ensure that no fishing occurs in the Donut Hole except in accordance with sound conservation and management rules."n296 While the Donut Hole Convention was negotiated with UNCLOS III in mind,n297 according to Ambassador Colson, "the Law of the Sea Convention can help the Donut Hole Convention by providing an alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure than no vessel undertakes conduct in the Central Bering Sea contrary to the provisions of the Donut Hole Convention."n298 The dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS III would enable the parties to "ensure enforcement of multilateral fishery conservation arrangements on the high seas ... The Law of the Sea dispute settlement option can act both as a deterrent and as a means to bring about final resolution should problems arise in the Donut Hole in the future."