These agreements indicate the power that UNCLOS III has had over fishing law. Yet until major fishing nations such as the United States ratify the convention, it cannot reach its full potential. The United States will suffer if fisheries continue to decline. Although the United States played a major role in initiating the Convention in 1973, and despite backing from President Clinton and other officials, many predict the Senate to put up a tough fight before it approves the treaty if it ever does. Opposition in the United States is primarily focused on provisions involving deep seabed mining and navigation rights for naval and air forces. The United States historically has been particularly concerned about retaining its right of innocent passage for warships through international straits. Until the United States becomes a party to the Convention, customary international law and other treaties will set U.S. rights and duties with respect to international fishing issues. The United States is already a party to several treaties by which it implements many of the convention's international fishing goals. A number of UNCLOS III's provisions have been incorporated into U.S. domestic law. The Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 established the United States' fishing policies. "The original act gave the United States jurisdiction over fishing grounds within 200 miles of the American coastline." Reauthorized by Congress in 1997, the act now implements tough conservation provisions. U.S. proponents of the Convention argue that the United States can only benefit from the UNCLOS III negotiations by ratifying the treaty. Specifically, the United States would be able to take advantage of the conservation and dispute settlement provisions, while also helping stabilize "the customary rules which states now argue do or do not exist." The United States' continued absence from the treaty may undermine U.S. power to influence the international law of the sea.