Revision of U.S. participation in UNCLOS will not undermine national sovereignty from Thu, 02/10/2022 - 17:44
The sovereignty costs associated with the Convention are grossly overstated primarily because many of these costs have already been accepted by the United States. In addition, the U.S. stands to gain sovereignty over 4.1 million square miles of territory by acceeding to the treaty.
Quicktabs: Arguments
The sovereignty costs associated with the Convention are grossly overstated primarily because many of these costs have already been accepted by the United States. Provisions of the Convention that infringe upon sovereignty include limitations on unilaterally claiming territorial waters, limitations on economically exploitable areas on the seas, limitations on the continental shelf, revenue sharing provisions for exploitation of resources on the high seas, imposition of environmental obligations, and a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism.22 As will be discussed next, the United States has already agreed to most of these provisions through a variety of previously signed treaties.23
Ultimately, the Convention settled on an outer limit for the continental shelf of 200 miles,38 which satisfied many geographically disadvantaged states (those that do have a naturally wide shelf), but also allowed special considerations for states with naturally broad shelves by granting them a potentially deeper shelf of up to 350 miles instead of the standard 200.39 With the exception of the special considerations, Convention provisions limiting the continental shelf echoed those in the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf which set the limit as 200 miles and gave coastal states exclusive rights over its continental shelf.40 The United States is a party to the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf and thus bound by these limits.41 However, if the United States qualifies for the special considerations provided for in the Convention for states with naturally broader shelves, it has the potential to increase its continental shelf.42
Many of these arguments have been put into perspective, however, by the actual history and operation of UNCLOS. Instead of posing a threat to national sovereignty, U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would actually enlarge U.S. power by providing a permanent seat on the ISA,58 and would be ―the greatest expansion of U.S. resource jurisdiction in the history of the nation.59 A permanent seat on the ISA would give the United States a strategic advantage, namely a ―greater ability to defeat amendments that are not in the U.S. interest, by blocking consensus or voting against such amendments.60
Concerns about abuse of power by the ISA are similarly unfounded, as the ISA operates independently from the U.N.61 and is comparable to other specialized U.N. organizations, many of which the U.S. already endorses. Further, the navigational protections for American ships on the high seas would enhance, not diminish, U.S. sovereignty.62 Some UNCLOS proponents also argue that claims to U.S. sovereignty are overstated in the context of a shared resource like the world‘s oceans.63 Finally, due to the inevitability of international reliance on UNCLOS to form international maritime law and regulate maritime disputes, the United States will suffer a huge loss of power if it fails to accede to the treaty.64
Even more laughable is the charge of a conspiracy to create a world government. In reality, the convention expanded national sovereign rights more than any international agreement in history. Its central thrust entails an extension of coastal resource and economic rights in a vastly enlarged exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf, while furthering sovereign rights and navigational freedom. On the contrary, the corridors of the law of the sea negotiations were predominantly filled with thoughts of nationalism rather than internationalism. And ironically, in their attack on the convention, the critics join extreme internationalists who have been key opponents of the treaty because it focuses on national sovereign rights.
Now let me also say that by those first principles, I am deeply disappointed at voices which continue to violate, it seems to me, those principles in this Law of the Sea negotiation. Allow me to present a few examples. Over and over again we hear voices urging that the Convention would give our sovereignty away. The Convention gives away not a single ounce of United States’ sovereignty. This is not only false, but it is absolutely upside down. What was the reality of these negotiations? The reality is the greatest expansion of national resource jurisdiction in the history of the world. This was a coastal state win, hugely, not some kind of internationalist win for the straw argument Elisabeth Mann Borgese socialists24 that are cited over and over again by opponents.25 They lost one hundred percent. Some of the academic community did support that.26 They did not get anywhere near this Convention. This convention was a victory for nationalism and state sovereignty. And that is why you see the massive extension of 200-mile economic zones and continental shelves in this Convention.27
No wonder everyone from the head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the president of the Natural Resources Defense Council to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (along with every living secretary of state) has argued that the United States should ratify unclos. It is far past time for the Senate to follow their advice. Skeptical Senate Republicans have stood in the way of ratification, arguing that the treaty would place limits on U.S. sovereignty. But that argument is a red herring, since the United States already follows all of the treaty’s guidelines anyway, and ratifying it would in fact give Washington new rights and greater influence. There are probably enough votes from moderate Republicans for the treaty to pass, if the president decided to make ratification a priority.
[Question] How do the panelists respond to the objection that UNCLOS would infringe on U.S. sovereignty? Professor Caron answered that, if anything, UNCLOS represents a tremendous effort to preserve sovereignty in oceans, and expressed that he does not understand the argument that UNCLOS somehow diminishes sovereignty. Ambassador Balton agreed, adding that it is important to try and understand the objections to UNCLOS. He countered the notion the United States can depend on the Navy to assert sovereignty over the ocean, explaining that the Navy is a major advocate of UNCLOS because it is more effective and efficient to use the rule of law rather than military force. Commander Kraska also noted that most materiel moves by non-naval vessels, so it is important to have a regime that prevents other countries from blocking those materiel shipments.
Many other claims are simply misplaced. There is no transfer of sovereignty or wealth to the International Seabed Authority.
We have never claimed sovereignty over the seabeds beyond the continental shelf, and have consistently taken the position that any such claim would be unlawful. This is made abundantly clear by our own Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. We neither have nor assert jurisdiction over the activities of foreign states and their nationals on the deep seabeds.
Nothing that could rationally be called sovereignty was conferred on the Seabed Authority. The powers of the Seabed Authority are very carefully defined and circumscribed, and are controlled by a Council on which we will have a permanent seat and a veto over regulations. Private companies have the right to apply for and receive long-term exclusive rights to mine sites on a first-come, first-served basis and have legal title to the minerals they extract. All parties to the Convention are obliged to respect those mining rights and recognize that legal title.
Myth: The United States is giving up sovereignty to a new international authority that will control the oceans.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The United States does not give up an ounce of sovereignty in this Convention. Rather, the Convention solidifies a truly massive increase in resource and economic jurisdiction of the United States, not only to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad continental margin in many areas even beyond that. The new International Seabed Authority created by this Convention, which, as noted, has existed for a decade and will continue to exist regardless of United States actions, deals solely with the mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. That is an area in which we not only have no sovereignty but also in which we and the entire world have opposed extension of national sovereignty claims. Moreover, to mine the deep seabed minerals requires security of tenure for the billion dollar plus costs of such an operation. Our industry has emphatically told us that they can not mine under a 'fishing approach' in which everyone simply goes out to seize the minerals. The Authority was a necessary specialized agency, of strictly limited jurisdiction, to deal with this need for security of tenure. Quite contrary to the recent testimony of one witness before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Seabed Authority would not have "the exclusive right to regulate what is done, by whom, when and under what circumstances in subsurface international waters and on the sea-floor."5 Rather, the Authority is a small, narrowly mandated specialized international agency that, emphatically, has no ability to control the water column and only has functional authority over the mining of the minerals of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Again, this is a necessary requirement for seabed mining, in an area beyond where any nation has sovereignty, to provide security of tenure to mine sites, without which mining will not occur6;