Russia
Quicktabs: Keywords
The author argues that "[t]he U.S. would be wise to ratify the United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea [UNCLOS], a convention that the U.S. Navy and coast guard already abide by, allowing the United States to utilize the international legal framework to successfully petition its case in the Arctic. In a world growing in tensions between old foes, the Arctic could prove an opportunity to cool down tensions and rebuild trust between the West and Russia."
[ More ]Tensions have increased a notch in the Arctic with the news that the Russians have started a major military exercise in the region. Nearly 40,000 servicemen, 41 warships and 15 submarines will be taking part in drills to make them combat-ready—a major show of strength in a region that has long been an area of strategic interest to Russia.
[ More ]Several U.S. lawmakers are warning U.S. military leaders about the pace and scope of Russia’s Arctic militarization, including the addition new brigades, ships and airfields to the fast-changing region.
[ More ]Washington does not think that Russia is militarizing the Arctic, US Special Representative for the Arctic Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. told TASS in an exclusive interview on Wednesday.
[ More ]Norwegians are cautiously watching Russia's military buildup in the Arctic, and while they would rather prepare quietly than stoke fears of a Crimean-style Russian grab in the Arctic, the country's memory of the Nazi invasion 75 years ago remains fresh.
[ More ]
The Arctic could become a site of future turmoil, and not just because of the emerging geopolitical tensions and militarization in the region. Beyond concerns of a frozen conflict in the icy north, there is the additional fear that the Barents and Kara Seas could become the location of a slow-motion nuclear disaster. Until 1991 the Soviet Union used the seas as a junkyard where it would dispose of its nuclear waste and several of its scuttled nuclear submarines could create Chernobyl-like environmental catastrophes.
[ More ]
Artur Chilingarov, who until recently was President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to the Arctic said in a recent speech at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø that cooperation with other Arctic states is an important part of Russia’s Arctic strategy.
[ More ]The author evaluates the expanding cooperation between India and Russia in the Arctic and argues that "[w]hile the Arctic might not seem like a priority for many Americans, it should not be overlooked as an important region for salvaging the U.S.-Russian relationship."
[ More ]The author evaluates whether the recent increase in Russian militarization of the Arctic poses a threat to the security or environment of the Arctic region.
[ More ]Vladimir Putin sends troops and jets to oil- and gas-rich Arctic region also coveted by Canada, United States, Norway and Denmark in an apparent show of military force.
[ More ]Pages
Secondly, as mentioned previously, Article 4 of the Convention asserts a ten-year limit for Parties to submit “excessive” continental shelf claims to the CLCS for adjudication. Adjudication, however, only provides an internationally recognized delineation of the claim and not a final delimitation where such a claim may be disputed by a state with an opposite or adjacent coast. Such disputes must be settled by mutual agreement of the contesting parties, or submitted to one of the aforementioned bodies for a binding resolution.
In the case of Russia in particular, upon acceding to the UNCLOS in 1997 and in accordance with Article 298 therein, it declared that it
"does not accept the procedures, provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding decisions with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 of the Convention, relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles; disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft, and disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction; and disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations.151
In effect, Moscow declared that it would accept delimitation of disputed boundaries only on a bilateral basis, negotiated outside the UNCLOS regime. Russia’s pending resubmission152 to the CLCS of its excessive continental shelf claims has been interpreted as merely a diplomatic maneuver of convenience to gain recognition for its claims and not an earnest effort to use the UNCLOS as a peaceful dispute resolution mechanism.
The largest deposits are found in the Arctic off the coast of Russia. The Russian state-controlled oil company Gazprom has approximately 113 trillion cubic feet of gas already under development in the fields it owns in the Barents Sea. The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources calculates that the territory claimed by Moscow could contain as much as 586 billion barrels of oil -- although these deposits are unproven. By comparison, all of Saudi Arabia's current proven oil reserves -- which admittedly exclude unexplored and speculative resources -- amount to only 260 billion barrels. The U.S. Geological Survey is just now launching the first comprehensive study of the Arctic's resources. The first areas to be studied are the 193,000-square-mile East Greenland Rift Basins. According to initial seismic readings, they could contain 9 billion barrels of oil and 86 trillion cubic feet of gas. Altogether, the Alaskan Arctic coast appears to hold at least 27 billion barrels of oil.
Until such a solution is found, the Arctic countries are likely to unilaterally grab as much territory as possible and exert sovereign control over opening sea-lanes wherever they can. In this legal no man's land, Arctic states are pursuing their narrowly defined national interests by laying down sonar nets and arming icebreakers to guard their claims. Russia has led the charge with its flag-planting antics this past summer. Moscow has been arguing that a submarine elevation called the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural extension of the Eurasian landmass and that therefore approximately half of the Arctic Ocean is its rightful inheritance. The UN commission that is reviewing the claim sent Russia back to gather additional geological proof, leading Artur Chilingarov, a celebrated Soviet-era explorer and now a close confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin, to declare, "The Arctic is ours and we should manifest our presence" while leading a mission to the North Pole last summer.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic might hold as much as 90 billion barrels (13 percent) of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 47.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) (30 percent) of the world’s undiscovered natural gas. At current consumption rates and assuming a 50 percent utilization rate of reserves, this is enough oil to meet global demand for 1.4 years and U.S. demand for six years. Arctic natural gas reserves may equal Russia’s proven reserves, the world’s largest.1 (See Table 1.)
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources estimates that the underwater Arctic region claimed by Russia could hold as much as 586 billion barrels of unproven oil reserves.2 The ministry estimates that proven oil deposits “in the Russian area of water proper” in the Barents, Pechora, Kara, East Siberian, Chukchi, and Laptev Seas could reach 418 million tons (3 billion barrels) and proven gas reserves could reach 7.7 tcm. Unexplored reserves could total 9.24 billion tons (67.7 billion barrels) of oil and 88.3 tcm of natural gas.3 Overall, Russia esti- mates that these areas have up to 10 trillion tons of hydrocarbon deposits, the equivalent of 73 trillion barrels of oil.4
In addition to oil and gas, the Arctic seabed may contain significant deposits of valuable metals and precious stones, such as gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, zinc, and diamonds. The rise of China, India, and other developing countries has increased global demand for these commodities.5
In August 2007, shortly after sending the scien- tific expedition to the Arctic ridge, then Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strate- gic bombers including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 (Blackjack), and Tu-22M3 (Backfire) and the long-range anti-submarine war- fare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown patrols since then.43 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu- 95 bombers refueled in-flight to extend their operational patrol area.44 Patrolling Russian bombers penetrated the 12-mile air defense identification zone surrounding Alaska 18 times during 2007.45 Since August 2007, the Russian Air Force has flown more than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.46
The Russian Navy is also expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.47 Lieutenant General Vladimir Sha- manov, head of the Defense Ministry’s combat train- ing department, said that the Russian Navy is increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines and that Russia’s military strategy might be reoriented to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf. Shamanov said that “we have a number of highly-professional military units in the Leningrad, Siberian and Far Eastern military districts, which are specifically trained for combat in Arctic regions.”48
On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has “resumed a warship presence in the Arctic.” These Arctic naval patrols include the area of the Spitsbergen archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an anti-subma- rine warfare destroyer followed by a guided-missile cruiser armed with 16 long-range anti-ship cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.49
In the Arctic, much of the supposed distress voiced by UNCLOS proponents stems from Russia’s vast claim of Arctic ECS that it submitted to the CLCS in 2001. The proponents incorrectly imply that Russia’s claim will result in the loss of Arctic resources that belong to the United States. According to Senator Lisa Murkowski (R–AK), for example, the U.S. failure to accede to UNCLOS would cause “a negligent forfeiture of valuable oil, gas and mineral deposits.”35
But the United States has not and will not “forfeit” a drop of Arctic oil to Russia or any other nation. For one thing, Russia’s claimed ECS area does not overlap any part of the U.S. Arctic ECS. To the contrary, Russia’s claim respects a boundary that the United States and the uSSR negotiated in 1990—the “Baker– Shevardnadze line.”36
The Russian claim extends the Baker–Shevardnadze line from the Bering Strait all the way to the North Pole, likely resulting in an excessive ECS claim in the central Arctic. However, Russia’s potentially excessive claim is located to the north of the limits of the U.S. ECS area. While the Russian claim may overlap with Canada’s ECS claim, it does not overlap any U.S. ECS area.37
In short, there is no conflict between the United States and Russia regarding the division of Arctic resources, including hydrocarbons. even if there were a conflict, Russia’s claim cannot be approved by the CLCS and would not be recognized by the United States (or Canada). Both UNCLOS and the CLCS’s procedural rules prevent the commission from considering any ECS area where there are overlapping claims: “In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute.”38
The United States may object to excessive ECS claims made by any member of UNCLOS even though the U.S. is not a party to the convention. Indeed, after Russia made its 2001 claim, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Norway each filed objections with the CLCS. In June 2002, as a result of the objections, the CLCS recommended to Russia that it provide a “revised submission” on its Arctic ECS claim.39 Russia reportedly will make an amended submission to the CLCS at some point in the future.
Like the other Arctic nations, except the U.S., Russia is a signatory to UNLOS. The USSR became a signatory in 1982; UNCLOS was later ratified in 1997 by the Russian Federation.117 Russia has utilized the provisions of UNCLOS to advance sovereignty, especially along the Northern Sea trade route, which passes through Russia’s northern Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Russia is using UNCLOS provisions in an attempt to exercise control over the Northern Sea route by requiring vessels to seek permits and submit their vessels to inspection due to the ice conditions. This is considered an overreach of authority by the U.S., which is protesting the plans.118 As a non-party to UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot utilize the established means of the treaty to protest.
Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The mili- tary is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push. The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances.”28 These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries.
Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States and has steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including stra- tegic bomber flights.29 During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times.30
The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the North- ern Fleet’s submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.31
In 2008, for the first time in 17 years, the U.S. Minerals Management Service began selling oil and gas leases for drilling rights in the Outer Continental Shelf to meet escalating energy demand.58 U.S. and interna- tional corporations are flocking to the High North. Arctic development is generating considerable revenue for the U.S. government. British Petroleum is pursuing the Lib- erty Development Project, a drilling project in the OCS. In February 2008, Royal Dutch Shell paid $2.1 billion for 275 lease blocks in the Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193. A total of seven companies partici- pated in the Chukchi Sea lease sale, which spans an area covering 5,354 blocks.59 In October 2009, the Interior Department approved two leases to Shell for exploration in the Beaufort Sea,60 conditioned on meeting strict environmental standards.61
Medvedev’s decision to link the Arctic with Russia’s feeling of being wronged in the former Soviet space is especially intriguing, as Kremlin policymakers likely view both regions in similar terms. Russia’s preoccupation with peripheral buffer zones goes back centuries, with the post-Soviet struggle for influence in its self-proclaimed “near abroad” being the most recent manifestation. In 2006, Russian military commentator O. Litkova went so far as to argue that “the Arctic could significantly compensate Russia for the losses she suffered as a result of the collapse of the USSR.”44 The Arctic, like the near abroad, is viewed in terms of sectorial divisions in which Russia believes that history and geography afford it exclusive right of influence. In the case of the Arctic, this belief stretches back at least to the Soviet’s 1926 decree in which all territories within the extreme meridians of Russia’s eastern and western borders running to the North Pole were claimed as Russian.
Russia fears that the ice melt will do to the Arctic what the fall of communism did in Eastern Europe, that is, usher in a period of NATO encroachment into their traditional space. In 2011, two leading academic voices in Russia opined:
Officials and experts agree that NATO continues on a course toward enhancing its activity in the Arctic. What consequence will this have on Russia? In all aspects – negative…. With regard to the fierce competition for Arctic resources, NATO will squeeze Russia out, just as it squeezes Russia in other regions of Europe in the sphere of security. It is obvious that the USA, which is not party to [UNCLOS] will use NATO to strengthen its position in the region….Therefore, Russia should prepare for a difficult and long battle for the settling of its interest and legal rights.45