INCSEA
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An increase in aggressive maritime behavior from the Russian Navy calls for a renewed committment to open communications and adherence to the maritime rule of law to avoid incidents escalating.
[ More ]The author considers a number of confidence building measures between the U.S. and China that would help de-escalate tensions.
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Singapore has suggested the expansion of a key naval protocol to defuse tensions in the South China Sea, the country’s new foreign minister said yesterday on the final day of his maiden voyage to China.
[ More ]In short, although an INCSEA agreement could, in theory, reduce the possibility of miscalculation during un-alerted sea encounters between U.S. and Chinese naval and air forces, there are many reasons that the United States should not pursue such an arrangement. First, unlike the Soviet Navy, the PLA Navy is not a "blue water" navy with global reach and responsibilities. Elevating the PLA Navy to such a stature would not be in the best interests of the United States. Second, the United States and the Soviet Union shared a common interest in freedom of navigation and access to the world's oceans. U.S. and Chinese interpretations of the law of the sea are diametrically opposed and cannot be reconciled. Third, INCSEA is a navy-to-navy agreement. However, the bulk of PRC harassment and aggressive behavior against U.S. ships is conducted by PRC non-military law enforcement agencies and civilian proxies (e.g., small cargo ships and fishing trawlers). An INCSEA agreement would not apply to these vessels and aircraft. Fourth, INCSEA is a Cold War instrument. Defining the U.S.-China relationship in such terms would be counter-productive for both nations. Fifth, based on its activities in the near seas over the past several decades, China can hardly be characterized as a responsible state actor. Its actions in the South China Sea, in particular, are inconsistent with the spirit and intent of INCSEA and reflect a series of broken promises, intimidation, and aggressive behavior towards its neighbors. Finally, unlike 1972, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and other international and regional arrangements provide internationally recognized and accepted measures that can be used to prevent incidents at sea." New measures are unnecessary.
In short, the Soviet Navy was a true global blue water navy. Its ships operated around the world with impunity and erased the image that the USSR was solely a continental power. The PLA Navy has not achieved a similar global status. In this regard, INCSEA also gave the Soviet Navy something the Red Army didn't have - a bilateral relationship with its U.S. counterpart. Since the Soviet Union had traditionally been considered a land power, INCSEA elevated the prestige of the Soviet Navy at home and abroad.30 An INCSEA agreement with the PRC would significantly enhance the stature of the PLA Navy by suggesting it was a naval power on par with U.S. and former Soviet Navies. It would also force the U.S. Navy to treat the PLA Navy as an equal, something which it clearly is not. Perhaps more importantly, however, the prestige gained by signing an INCSEA agreement could lead the Chinese government to allocate a larger percentage of the defense budget to the PLA Navy. In 2010, the PLA Navy was already receiving more than one-third of a defense budget that has experienced double-digit growth for the last twenty years.31
It is also important to note that UNCLOS does not treat intelligence collection as a threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state in violation of the U.N. Charter. Article 19(2)(c) clearly distinguishes collecting intelligence from "threat or use of force," which is discussed as a separate prohibited activity in Article 19(2)(a) for ships engaged in innocent passage. This issue was resolved by the Security Council in 1960 following the shoot down of a U.S. U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk, Russia. An effort by the Soviet Union to have the Security Council decide that the activity of the U.S. spy plane was an act of aggression was soundly defeated seven to two (with two abstentions), thereby reaffirming the legality of peacetime intelligence collection under the U.N. Charter.47 This view is shared by most experts.4