Arctic
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Russia, Denmark and Canada all are trying to prove that their land masses extend to the North Pole, handing the international commission that gives its expert recommendations on such matters its most highly contested issue to date and highlighting the central role the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea will have in determining the future of the rapidly changing region.
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With tensions rising between Russia and Western powers, the U.S. held submarine exercises in the Arctic Ocean - the body of water where the Russian and U.S. subs are likeliest to encounter each other.
[ More ]While much of the world is focused on the Russian incursion into the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, another long-term move may allow the former Soviet navy to dominate U.S. interests to the north: the Arctic.
[ More ]The US wants to play a leading role in exploring the Arctic but doesn’t have enough facilities or resources, and basically lags behind Russia, according to Edward Struzik, an Arctic policy researcher.
[ More ]The United States and four other Arctic nations have tentatively agreed to prevent commercial fishing in the high Arctic.
[ More ]U.S. officials are heading to Greenland for a three-day meeting to persuade other Arctic nations to place a moratorium on high-seas fishing in the Arctic Ocean, where climate change is melting the permanent ice cap and allowing trawlers in for the first time in human history.
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After the US announced a new Arctic ambassadorship, Chinese media reaffirmed Beijing’s interests in the region.
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Scholars these days are busy seeking to divine China’s intentions in the Arctic. Meanwhile, though, Japan and Russia have taken discreet – though decisive – steps to secure good relations and a better foothold in each other’s backyards.
[ More ]Russian leaders now primarily see the Arctic as a potential source of economic growth for the country, both as a strategic resource base for the future and a potential maritime trade route.
[ More ]The 40-year-old Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Star returned to the Arctic Ocean this summer after seven years in semiretirement, charging into a thinning polar ice sheet that U.S. defense officials predict will give way to new commercial waterways and a resource-rich frontier by midcentury.
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Then there are the minerals. Now, longer summers are providing additional time to prospect mineral deposits, and retreating sea ice is opening deep-water ports for their export. The Arctic is already home to the world’s most productive zinc mine, Red Dog, in northern Alaska, and its most productive nickel mine, in Norilsk, in northern Russia. Thanks mostly to Russia, the Arctic produces 40 percent of the world’s palladium, 20 percent of its diamonds, 15 percent of its platinum, 11 percent of its cobalt, ten percent of its nickel, nine percent of its tungsten, and eight percent of its zinc. Alaska has more than 150 prospective deposits of rare-earth elements, and if the state were its own country, it would rank in the top ten in global reserves for many of these minerals. And all these assets are just the beginning. The Arctic has only begun to be surveyed. Once the digging starts, there is every reason to expect that, as often happens, even greater quantities of riches will be uncovered.
For all the changing conditions of the Arctic Ocean, one thing has not changed: the basic rules of international law relating to oceans. These laws apply to the Arctic in the same way that they apply to all the oceans. The international legal oceanic framework remains the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States has not yet become party to it, despite the fact that we recognize its basic provisions as reflecting customary international law and follow them as a matter of long-standing policy.
Our status as a non-party to the UNCLOS, however, puts the United States at a disadvantage in a number of fundamental respects, most of which lie beyond the scope of this discussion. But our efforts to address the changing Arctic region bring at least two of those disadvantages into sharp focus.
First, we are the only Arctic nation that is not party to the UNCLOS. As our neighbors debate new ways to collaborate on Arctic Ocean issues, they necessarily will rely on the UNCLOS as the touchstone for their efforts. The United States will continue to take part in these initiatives, but our non-party status deprives us of the full range of influence we would otherwise enjoy in these discussions.
Second, the four other nations that border the central Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, and Russia—are advancing their claims to the continental shelf in the Arctic beyond 200 nautical miles from their coastal baselines. The UNCLOS not only establishes the criteria for claiming such areas of continental shelf, it also sets up a process to secure legal certainty and international recognition of the outer limits of those shelves. The United States also believes that it will be able to claim a significant portion of the Arctic Ocean seafloor as part of our continental shelf. But as a non-party to the UNCLOS, we place ourselves at a serious disadvantage in obtaining that legal certainty and international recognition.
From Russia’s security strategy,40 and evidence of Russia’s pragmatism in its approach to the Arctic, it is possible to draw two broad security conclusions: First, Russia is unlikely to engage in any military confrontation that could potentially damage its economic security. This is consistent with Russia’s broadly conciliatory approach to the Arctic, despite its often-inflammatory rhetoric, and symbolic actions such as placing a Russian flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole. Russia’s approach is underpinned by a belief that it has both the law, and scientific evidence in its favour, and that it therefore has a legal right to a significant unclaimed portion of Arctic seabed, particularly along the Lomonosov Ridge. If Russia’s claim to the CLCS is eventually successful, it stands to gain approximately 460,000 square miles, or half of the Arctic’s seabed and the rich resources contained therein.41 The second conclusion this author can draw is that should Russia fail to gain the Arctic resources it expects through legal and procedural means, there is so much at stake in terms of Russia’s economic security, that other Arctic actors need to plan for the contingency that Russia might attempt to assert its control over Arctic resources and territory through alternate means.42
While some media reports have attempted to link Canada and Russia’s increased military focus on the Arctic as evidence of a desire for military confrontation over Arctic resources,53 there is little in terms of strategic intent that would lend credibility to such claims. In Canada’s case, it has long perceived the need to demonstrate a tangible presence over the vast Arctic territory it claims as its own. The sheer scale of the territory in question, and the costs and logistics associated with maintaining even a modest presence in the Arctic, has historically led to Canada talking tough on Arctic sovereignty, but doing little by way of action. As the Arctic now becomes more accessible, Canada merely recognises the need to match its actions more closely with its rhetoric. If the Canadian government follows through with the majority of the initiatives mentioned above, it would only serve to reinforce Canada’s Arctic sovereignty claims and be seen by its own public to be taking action on a highly topical issue. These actions will not destabilize the Arctic, provided that the Canadian government is clear and consistent in communicating its intent.
In terms of capabilities, the US is like most Arctic neighbours in not being adequately equipped to optimally operate year-round in an arctic maritime environment. After the events of September 11, 2001 funding for polar research was dramatically cut, and the US was left with only three Arctic-capable icebreakers.61 The disparity between the growing importance of the Arctic and the lack of capability to adequately patrol it has been recognised by the US government.62 The issue evidently has not reached a point yet where significant resources will be diverted to the Arctic at the expense of other priorities. Thus like most Arctic states at the moment, with the possible exception of Russia and to a lesser degree Canada, the US chooses to substitute rhetoric over substance.
From a security perspective, this may in fact be viewed in a positive light. While the US and other Arctic states recognise that access to the region may dramatically increase in coming years, the current reality is that Arctic sea ice will dramatically limit marine traffic and resource exploitation for the immediate future. The longer the sea ice serves as a deterrent for any possible ‘scramble for the Arctic’, the more time is available for stakeholders to use dialogue to diffuse stress points and find compromise positions on contentious issues such as boundary disputes. One such area of friction that the US could eliminate is its non-ratification of UNCLOS. Ratifying the Convention would send a signal to all Arctic and maritime stakeholders that the US is not simply a hegemonic state that abides by only its own rules, but a member of the global community that values and upholds international law.
Unfortunately, as UNCLOS nears its 40th anniversary, the United States has yet to ratify the treaty despite strong urging from the U.S. Defense and State Departments, as well as from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In its “Arctic Roadmap,” the U.S. Navy actively supports accession to UNCLOS because it provides “effective governance: freedom of navigation, treaty vs. customary law, environmental laws, and extended continental shelf claims.”33 Joining UNCLOS would give the U.S. government a clear framework in which it could more effectively confront growing difficulties pertaining to freedom of navigation in the Arctic region. By not ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States is at a considerable economic disadvantage as the other Arctic coastal states submit their claims. The United States maintains the world’s largest EEZ and has 360 major commercial ports. With potential claims of up to 600 miles of possible resource-rich continental shelf territory in the Arctic, remaining outside the UNCLOS only erodes the position of the United States in the region.
These difficulties have been made explicitly clear in recent reports from the Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy. The Department of Defense has noted that its “lack of surface capabilities able to operate in the marginal ice zone and pack ice will increasingly affect accomplishment of this mission area [sea control] over the mid- to far-term.”34 Moreover, the U.S. Navy “acknowledges that while the Arctic is not unfamiliar for the Navy, expanded capabilities and capacity may be required for the Navy to increase its engagement in this region.”35 These challenges are likely to increase moving forward unless further action is taken. As discussed below in further detail, the fact that the United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS compounds these issues.
The foundational element of any U.S. security strategy for the Arctic, including NSPD-66, is to ensure freedom of navigation. As a nation heavily dependent on shipping and maritime access, the United States has a vital national interest in supporting the most stringent enforcement of open sea lanes of communication. The most effective tool for governing and enforcing the right of free passage in international straits is the UNCLOS treaty.
The fact that the United States has not ratified the treaty is of key relevance to its efforts to ensure freedom of navigation in the Arctic and to take full advantage of the region’s economic benefits. A product of nine years of international collaboration and active U.S. participation, UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and provides the most comprehensive framework available for governing the world’s oceans, including the Arctic. The treaty established internationally rec- ognized measures to claim sea areas and rights to territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and extensions of national underwater continental shelves. Currently 161 countries and the European Union have joined the convention.32 While the United States has not ratified the treaty, it does view the treaty as international customary law and abides by nearly all its articles. It is unclear when the U.S. Senate will ratify the treaty, although both the Bush and the Obama administrations have sought ratification.
Traditionally, national security is conceptualized as hard and soft power or military might and diplomatic influence. Economic strength, however, is the foundation of power. Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proclaimed that debt poses the biggest threat to U.S. national security.1 Although his warning hardly raised an eyebrow, the economic engines that are China and Germany—and their corresponding global strength—are evidence of the interdependence of economic and national security.
For the United States, greater economic security can be supplied by the untapped resources of the Arctic, where this nation has been dealt an exceptional, yet underutilized, hand. The U.S. share of the Alaskan Arctic holds an estimated 30 billion barrels of oil and more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, as well as rare earth minerals and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal sources of energy. Unprecedented climate changes have increased access to the region and transformed it into an emerging commercial sector. In total, the economic potential amounts to trillions of dollars. In this period of financial stagnation, developing these energy sources would be a tremendous boost to the United States.
So far, the goal of the Arctic states seems to be cooperation in protecting the environment while encouraging investment in hydrocarbon development. This goal is reflected in both regional and country-specific documents. At a regional level, Arctic states have repeatedly declared goals for cooperation. For example, the Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council—the main regional coordinating body of Arctic states—in 1996 with the following mission statement:
[T]o provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues; in particular, issues of28 sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
More recently in 2008, five key Arctic states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States—adopted the Ilulissat Declaration, claiming a set of unified policy goals.29 The Ilulissat Declaration captured the following regional policies of the Arctic States:
- commitment to the current legal framework and an observation that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean;”30
- recognition of the role of the Arctic States in protecting the unique Arctic ecosystem; and
- commitment to a cooperative approach to making Arctic development a sustainable undertaking.31
First and foremost, China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to arctic resources, sea-lanes, and governance. this entitlement relies on various justifications. as a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by arctic warming, a permanent member of the UN security Council, and the world’s most populous state, China sees its role in arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral Yin Zhuo made this point in March 2010, proclaiming that “the arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.”85 similarly, in 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that arctic countries should “ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the common interests of the international community.”86 Hu, it seems, was advising the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes of the arctic.
China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNCLOS to argue that the arctic and its resources are the “common heritage of all humankind” and do not belong exclusively to the arctic five.87 In reality, “common heritage” in UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNClos as the area that lies beyond EEZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented,88 percent of the arctic seabed would likely fall under their combined sovereign EEZ jurisdictions, with the small “doughnut hole” in the center qualifying as the common heritage.88 since, however, most of the resource wealth in the arctic lies within these claims, China perpetuates the notion that the entire arctic ocean is the common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there.89 this sort of “lawfare,” or misuse of the “law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective,” is an essential component of China’s strategy, enabling the PRC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-arctic state through asymmetrical means.90