The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security
Quicktabs: Citation
The international body responsible for claims submitted to extend a state’s EEZ based on the continental shelf, is the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).29 For a state to make a claim to this committee, it must be a ratified signatory to the UNCLOS, and must make any claims within 10 years of ratification.30 The CLCS has itself come under criticism. Most notably, excessive CLCS confidentiality rules leave states unclear as to the Commission’s rationale for its recommendations regarding a submitted claim.31 A key point of clarification is required here. The CLCS’ role is to make recommendations to the states as to whether their claims fully meet the criterion set out in UNCLOS article 76, and are fully backed by adequate scientific data. These ‘recommendations’ are more than they seem, however. States that make claims to the CLCS agree that the recommendations shall be final and binding, giving the CLCS’ recommendations the de facto status of rulings. What the CLCS is not, is an arbitration body that has any mandate to settle conflicting or overlapping claims, unless the disputing parties jointly request it.32 In spite of these criticisms, the stakes are sufficiently high to have prompted Arctic coastal states such as Russia, Canada and Denmark to embark on undersea mapping expeditions to bolster current and future continental shelf submissions to the CLCS.
From Russia’s security strategy,40 and evidence of Russia’s pragmatism in its approach to the Arctic, it is possible to draw two broad security conclusions: First, Russia is unlikely to engage in any military confrontation that could potentially damage its economic security. This is consistent with Russia’s broadly conciliatory approach to the Arctic, despite its often-inflammatory rhetoric, and symbolic actions such as placing a Russian flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole. Russia’s approach is underpinned by a belief that it has both the law, and scientific evidence in its favour, and that it therefore has a legal right to a significant unclaimed portion of Arctic seabed, particularly along the Lomonosov Ridge. If Russia’s claim to the CLCS is eventually successful, it stands to gain approximately 460,000 square miles, or half of the Arctic’s seabed and the rich resources contained therein.41 The second conclusion this author can draw is that should Russia fail to gain the Arctic resources it expects through legal and procedural means, there is so much at stake in terms of Russia’s economic security, that other Arctic actors need to plan for the contingency that Russia might attempt to assert its control over Arctic resources and territory through alternate means.42
With an increasingly globalized world comes a globalized economy. Inherent in such an economy is a security element, which serves to deter states from actions that run contrary to the greater economic good. When coupled with the military deterrent provided by the US, it is all but inconceivable that Russia, or any Arctic state would engage in military activity in the region, which goes beyond a simple show of force.
This suggests that the existing security apparatus in place in the Arctic is sufficient to meet both current and future requirements. That apparatus is built around the sovereign authority of the Arctic Five states, and is bolstered by the Arctic Council. The Council provides not only a forum for mutual discussion and understanding, but also encourages consistency in Arctic policy development and enforcement. Backing it up is the legislative framework of UNCLOS, which provides the legal backbone from which to seek resolution of maritime boundary disputes. The globalized economy provides an additional deterrent to irresponsible actors, primarily through the actions of risk-averse investors who will sell off investments and thus rob the actors of much needed capital.
If one were to form an opinion about the risk of conflict stemming from a perceived ‘scramble for the Arctic’, such as is portrayed by media sources, and even a few well-respected academic writers, it would be understandable if the reader came away with an opinion that the Arctic is a powder-keg waiting to be ignited by greed-fuelled interests.
Based on the research presented here, it is hoped that a more measured opinion may be formed, which recognizes that while there are numerous sources for potential dispute in the region, there is also the recognition that Arctic stakeholders have much more to gain through cooperation than through confrontation. In spite of isolated moments of inflammatory rhetoric and grandstanding, the relationship between the key Arctic states and stakeholders has been marked by optimism and mutual cooperation. There is an incredible opportunity for governments, industries and indigenous peoples to all benefit from the changes occurring in the Arctic. While the current governance and security architecture can be improved upon to ensure that consistent and ade- quate legislation and enforcement mechanisms are in place, what is needed above all is continued cooperation and goodwill between all the parties that stand to gain from the opportunities presenting themselves in the High North.
While some media reports have attempted to link Canada and Russia’s increased military focus on the Arctic as evidence of a desire for military confrontation over Arctic resources,53 there is little in terms of strategic intent that would lend credibility to such claims. In Canada’s case, it has long perceived the need to demonstrate a tangible presence over the vast Arctic territory it claims as its own. The sheer scale of the territory in question, and the costs and logistics associated with maintaining even a modest presence in the Arctic, has historically led to Canada talking tough on Arctic sovereignty, but doing little by way of action. As the Arctic now becomes more accessible, Canada merely recognises the need to match its actions more closely with its rhetoric. If the Canadian government follows through with the majority of the initiatives mentioned above, it would only serve to reinforce Canada’s Arctic sovereignty claims and be seen by its own public to be taking action on a highly topical issue. These actions will not destabilize the Arctic, provided that the Canadian government is clear and consistent in communicating its intent.
In terms of capabilities, the US is like most Arctic neighbours in not being adequately equipped to optimally operate year-round in an arctic maritime environment. After the events of September 11, 2001 funding for polar research was dramatically cut, and the US was left with only three Arctic-capable icebreakers.61 The disparity between the growing importance of the Arctic and the lack of capability to adequately patrol it has been recognised by the US government.62 The issue evidently has not reached a point yet where significant resources will be diverted to the Arctic at the expense of other priorities. Thus like most Arctic states at the moment, with the possible exception of Russia and to a lesser degree Canada, the US chooses to substitute rhetoric over substance.
From a security perspective, this may in fact be viewed in a positive light. While the US and other Arctic states recognise that access to the region may dramatically increase in coming years, the current reality is that Arctic sea ice will dramatically limit marine traffic and resource exploitation for the immediate future. The longer the sea ice serves as a deterrent for any possible ‘scramble for the Arctic’, the more time is available for stakeholders to use dialogue to diffuse stress points and find compromise positions on contentious issues such as boundary disputes. One such area of friction that the US could eliminate is its non-ratification of UNCLOS. Ratifying the Convention would send a signal to all Arctic and maritime stakeholders that the US is not simply a hegemonic state that abides by only its own rules, but a member of the global community that values and upholds international law.