International law unlikely to dissuade Iran from taking steps to close Strait of Hormuz

Consider the luckless USS Pueblo. Inter- national law did not prevent North Korea from illegally seizing the intelligence ship; had there been a LOST in 1968, it would have offered the Pueblo no additional protection. America was similarly unaided by international law in its con- frontation with China over the U.S. EP-3 sur- veillance plane operating in international air- space in 2001. Schachte contends that “if you look at the Persian Gulf situation, for example, we didn’t have problems with Iran or Oman in using the Strait of Hormuz, because they recognized that the language of the treaty was clear.”58 Yet Iran, which bombed Kuwaiti oil tankers during its war with Iraq, is unlikely to be deterred by an international treaty, however unambiguous its provisions. If Iran, or any other maritime state, believed it to be in its vital interest to prevent the passage of U.S. ships, then its signature on the LOST would not likely prevent it from act- ing: rather, the country would be primarily concerned about America’s willingness and ability to force passage. And in a world from which the Soviet Union has disappeared, the Russian navy is rusting in port, China has yet to develop a blue-water navy, and Third World conflicts are no longer viewed as threatening the United States, Washington is rarely going to have to fight its way through contested international waterways. Countries will be inclined to let the ships pass rather than face the wrath of the U.S. Navy.