U.S. accession to UNCLOS would reduce risk from asserting freedom of navigation rights and improve U.S. diplomatic position with violators

Since UNCLOS would not require any change in US maritime policy, some have argued that there is, therefore, no appreciable benefit to joining the Convention. On the contrary, UNCLOS would equip the US with certain diplomatic tools that would otherwise be unavailable.¹⁷⁸ Proponents concede, however, that operationally nothing would change in terms of US Naval procedure.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, it remains difficult to deny that UNCLOS would provide measurable benefits towards the US Navy's ability to achieve its maritime objectives.¹⁸⁰

For example, at one point, the Libyans had a very restrictive interpretation of freedom of the seas as it applied in the Gulf of Libya.¹⁸¹ During this time the United States pursued a policy where it would deliberately sail out into waters, considered by the Libyans, as waters in which they possessed a greater degree of jurisdiction than the United States recognized.¹⁸² Such policies involved a considerable amount of risk placed on both the forces undertaking the exercises in question, and on aggravating an already delicate diplomatic situation. Therefore, although the US will always exercise its navigational rights, the tools available within the UNCLOS framework reduce the level of risk inherent in the continual exercise maritime power in order to maintain freedom of navigation.¹⁸³ Another example of the diplomacy enhancing features UNCLOS is illustrated through China, a UNCLOS State-party, who has drawn widespread criticism for its exaggerated jurisdictional claims with respect to the South China Sea, way beyond that of what is legally afforded to it under UNCLOS.¹⁸⁴ However, as it stands today, the United States is placed in quite the diplomatic quagmire, attempting to deter Chinese derogation from UNCLOS principles that itself has failed to formally agree to. Indeed this, along with other similar endeavors have consistently been undermined due to the tenuous diplomatic position of insisting compliance with a legal regime which the US itself is not even a party.¹⁸⁵