Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident
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This study attempts to fill this gap by uncovering why China’s coercive diplomacy took the form it did in the case of the March 2009 Impeccable incident in which five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in close proximity to the US Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable in contravention to accepted naval practice.5 At the time of the encounter, the Impeccable was approximately 75 nautical miles southeast of the Chinese Sanya Naval Base, in the international waters of the South China Sea, but inside China’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).6 Chinese leaders most likely believed that the Impeccable was gathering underwater acoustical data that could help track Chinese submarines located nearby and opposed such surveil- lance activities.7 Two of the five ships involved, Chinese-flagged fishing trawlers, came within 50 feet of the US ship and the crew attempted to snag the ship’s towed acoustic array sonar. After hours of confrontation, the Impeccable was eventually able to leave the area and an American destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, was sent to provide additional protection. Though the Chinese government publicly denied any role in organizing the actions of the Chinese vessels, the fact that the Chinese ships involved included a navy intelligence collection ship, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol vessel, and a State Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, calls this into question.9 Furthermore, the fact that the Chinese sailors knew what the towed array sonar looked like as well as its purpose suggests instruction.
Last, even though China presented its position in legal terms to counter and undermine the US and avoid international backlash, the main goal of Chinese coercive diplomacy is to compel the US to stop conducting surveillance activities near sensitive military areas. A review of Chinese writings reveal that it is displeased with US intelligence gathering more generally, even when the platforms are not located in China’s claimed EEZ.97 However, there are long-term implications of any US concessions on this issue. Yielding to pressure may affect China’s future expectations of the effectiveness of the use of military provocation vis-a` -vis the US, which may lead to increases in bilateral tensions and threats to regional security. In the words of Schelling, ‘to yield may be to signal that one can be expected to yield.’98 Furthermore, the regional allies and strategic partners that are hedging their bets against the possibility of US disengagement from the region may interpret compliance with Chinese demands as a lack of US resolve. This would affect the strategic calculations of regional players, especially on how to prioritize their relationships with the US and China.99 Concessions also give legitimacy to China’s EEZ position and potentially to some of China’s territorial claims, which would shift the status quo in a way that is harmful to regional stability. According to Peter Dutton, ‘China’s efforts to alter the balance of maritime rights are part of its overall anti-access strategy, and could have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of US operations in the region, especially in times of crisis.’100 To avoid this, the US needs to maintain its commitment to a strong regional presence and the preservation of freedom of the sea.
In addition, official US statements in the future need to challenge Chinese assertions that China’s position has a legal basis, whereas the US position is merely derived from its hegemonic interests. The US should encourage all countries that value its position on international maritime law or just want to discourage Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea to openly support the US position. According to the Department of Defense Maritime Claims Reference Manual, of the 150 states with maritime claims, 127 states recognize the right of all states to undertake military activities in the EEZ and only 22 side with China by making some form of claim to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ.94 Joint statements made with Asian leaders and with leaders of developing countries supporting the US interpretation of EEZ rights would weaken China’s argument that the US position hurts the interests of the less powerful. Moreover, China tends to cooperate more with broad international efforts than with unilateral US efforts.95 The US should consider addressing China’s position on UNCLOS and related provocative behavior in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and encouraging regional allies to bring up the issue through regional institutions such as ASEAN. In that regard, the Obama administration’s recent offer to facilitate multilateral talks between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors about the territorial status of islands in the South China Sea is a step in the right direction.
But the Americans have forgotten one thing. China is not so easy to bully . . . They will not trade with anybody their state sovereignty or national dignity under any circumstances. They are like that on the problem of Tibet; they are like that on the problem of the South China Sea. On matters involving state sovereignty, China does not budge.