Statement of Rear Admiral William L. Schachte: Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention
Quicktabs: Citation
Nothing in the Convention will affect the way we currently conduct surveillance and intelligence activities at sea. Opponents to the Convention argue that the Convention’s provisions on innocent passage – Articles 19 and 20 – will prohibit or otherwise adversely affect U.S. intelligence activities in foreign territorial seas at a time when such activity is vital to our national security. I can say without hesitation that nothing could be further from the truth.
While it is true that Article 19 provides that intelligence collection within the territorial sea is inconsistent with the innocent passage regime and that Article 20 provides that submarines must navigate on the surface when engaged in innocent passage, it’s a far stretch to thus conclude that the Convention prohibits intelligence collection and requires submarines to navigate on the surface when transiting the territorial sea. Nothing in Article 19 prohibits a U.S. vessel from engaging in intelligence activities in a foreign territorial sea. If a vessel does engage in such activities, it simply cannot claim that it is engaged in innocent passage. The same rule has applied for the past seven decades. Similarly, Article 20 does not prohibit submerged transits through the territorial sea, per se. Article 20 merely repeats the rule from the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, a convention to which the United States is a party. The rule concerning submerged transits from the 1958 Convention has been the consistent position of nations, including the United States, for more than 70 years and it has never been interpreted as prohibiting or otherwise restricting intelligence collection activities or submerged transits in the territorial sea. In short, if or when the need arises to collect intelligence in a foreign territorial sea, nothing in the LOS Convention will prohibit that activity.
I think it is also important to note, Mr. Chairman, that not everyone agreed with our “customary international law” interpretation announced by President Reagan in his 1983 Ocean Policy Statement. However, our ability to influence the development of customary law changed dramatically in 1994 when the Convention entered into force. As a non-Party, we no longer had a voice at the table when important decisions were being made on how to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention. As a result, over the past 10 years, we have witnessed a resurgence of creeping jurisdiction around the world. Coastal States are increasingly exerting greater control over waters off their coasts and a growing number of States have started to challenge US military activities at sea, particularly in their 200 nautical mile (nm) EEZ.
I also believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is short-sighted to argue that, if the customary law system somehow breaks down, the United States, as the world’s pre-eminent naval power, wouldn’t have any trouble enforcing it. Clearly, our Navy could engage in such an effort. However, enforcing our navigational rights against every coastal nation in the event the Convention and customary law systems collapse would be very costly, both politically and economically. Moreover, it would divert our forces from their primary missions, including the long-term global war on terrorism. Excessive coastal nation claims are the primary threat to our navigational freedoms. Those claims can spread like a contagious virus, as they did in the 20th Century. The added legal security we get from a binding treaty permits us to use our military forces and diminishing resources more efficiently and effectively by concentrating on their primary missions.
Concerns have been raised that it is not in the best interests of the United States to have its maritime activities subject to the control of an international tribunal, like the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). That concern is clearly misplaced. While the Convention does establish a Tribunal, parties are free to choose other methods of dispute resolution. The United States has already indicated that if it becomes a party it will elect two forms of arbitration rather than the Tribunal or the ICJ.
More importantly, this concern fails to recognize that no country would subordinate its national security activities to an international tribunal. This is a point that everyone understood during the negotiations of the Convention, and that is why Article 286 of the Convention makes clear that the application of the compulsory dispute resolution procedures of section 2 of Part XV are subject to the provisions of section 3 of Part XV, which includes a provision that allows for military exemptions, which would encompass military activities conducted pursuant to PSI.
Some may try to argue that Article 288 allows a court or tribunal to make the final determination as to whether or not it has jurisdiction over a matter where there is a dispute between the parties as to the court’s jurisdiction. They argue that Article 288 could be read to authorize a court or tribunal to make a threshold jurisdictional determination of whether an activity is a military activity or not and, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal. However, Article 288 is also found in section 2 of Part XV and therefore does not apply to disputes involving what the U.S. Government has declared to be a military activity under section 3 of Part XV. I submit this interpretation is supported by the negotiating history of the Convention, which reflects that certain disputes, including military activities, are considered to be so sensitive that they are best resolved diplomatically, rather than judicially. This interpretation is also supported by a plain reading of the Convention.
