Revision of U.S. already abides by UNCLOS as a matter of customary international law and domestic policy from Sat, 03/01/2014 - 16:26
Even though U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, it still has committed itself to abiding by its principles in two ways: through numerous policy statements and laws drafted in accordance with UNCLOS and committing the U.S. to abiding by it; and due to the fact that the Law of the Sea has become customary international law.
Quicktabs: Arguments
UNCLOS relies for these purposes on dozens of such conventions, but this article will focus on five that are particularly significant and wide-ranging: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (the SOLAS Convention); the InternationalManagement Code for the SafeOperation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code); the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention); the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention); and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
Before turning to the specifics, however, a few background topics need to be discussed. The first of these is the "organization that has probably had the most substantial direct effect on the law of the sea"-the International Maritime Organization. 39 The IMOis the "United Nations' specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships."40 The convention establishing the IMOwas adopted in 1948 and came into effect in 1958; the IMO's first meeting was held in 1959.Most of its work is done in committees, including the Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee, and the Legal Committee. These bodies identify needs for new conventions or for amendments to existing ones. All of the important conventions to be discussed in this section were adopted under the auspices of the IMO, which today oversees the process of keeping these conventions abreast of developments in maritime and related industries.
In August 2007, Russian scientists descended 4,261 meters (13,976 feet) beneath sea level at the North Pole, using two dual-manned submers- ibles, Mir-1 and Mir-2.18 The mission had two purposes: first, to collect samples of soil from the seabed directly beneath the North Pole, which is within the claims that Russia submitted to the commission and along the Lomonosov Ridge; and second, to place a one meter tall titanium Russian Federation flag, creating nationalist symbolism behind Russia’s claim and reinforcing its dedication to being a major power, both scientifically and economically, in the Arctic region.
Because of the suddenness of the claim by Russia, four other countries with a potential stake (Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Canada), and one without a stake (Japan), have submitted written responses to the Commission. Denmark and Canada have both refused to offer an opinion immediately after Russia’s submission, citing the necessity of additional and more specific data.19 The remaining countries, the United States, Norway, and Japan,20 have offered negative responses. Norway, having submitted a claim in November 2006 (beyond their 200 nautical mile EEZ) that does not overlap with Russia’s claim, was most concerned with overlapping claims along mutual borders, a “maritime dispute” that has not yet been settled and which could be problematic for both countries.21 The United States submitted a detailed response, using scientific data to support a position that neither the Alpha-Mendeleev or the Lomonosov Ridges are part of any state’s continental shelf, but are rather independent features consisting of magma or freestanding formations. The official U.S. position advised:
The integrity of the Convention and the process for establishing the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles ultimately depends on adherence to legal criteria and whether the geological criteria and interpretations applied are accepted as valid by the weight of informed scientific opinion. A broad scientific consensus of the relevant experts... is critical to the credibility of the Commission and the Convention.22
This statement suggests that the United States would like the convention and commission to look strongly and carefully at the evidence presented by Russia before determining any course of action. It also indicates that the United States is first deferring to the standards established in UNCLOS for dispute settlement, despite not being a signatory to the agreement.
Joining is a win/win proposition. We will not have to change U.S. laws or practices, or give up rights, and we will benefit in a variety of ways. The United States already acts in accordance with the Convention for a number of reasons:
- First, as noted, we are party to a group of 1958 treaties that contain many of the same provisions as the Convention.
- Second, the United States heavily influenced the content of the 1982 Convention, based on U.S. law, policy, and practice.
- Finally, the treaty has been the cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy since 1983, when President Reagan instructed the Executive Branch to act in accordance with the Convention’s provisions with the exception of deep seabed mining.
Thus, we are in the advantageous position in the case of this treaty that U.S. adherence to its terms is already time-tested and works well.
The legal regime applicable in the Arctic is the customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it considers the convention’s navigation and jurisdiction provisions to be binding international law. The convention advances and protects the national security, environmental, and economic interests of all nations, including the United States, codifying the navigational rights and freedoms that are critical to American military and commercial vessels. It also secures economic rights to offshore natural resources.26 Article 76 of the convention allows nations to claim jurisdiction past their exclusive economic zones on the basis of undersea features that are considered extensions of the continental shelf, if a structure is geologically similar to a nation’s continental landmass.27 In May 2008 five of the Arctic nations adopted the Illulissat Declaration, which acknowledges that “the Law of the Sea is the relevant legal framework in the Arctic” and that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic,” committing the signatories to an “orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”28
Currently there are overlapping, unresolved maritime boundary claims between the United States and Canada, Canada and Denmark, Denmark and Norway, and Norway and Russia. At this time, none of these disputed boundary claims pose a threat to global stability. While the United States and Canada disagree on the location of the maritime boundary in and northward of the Beaufort Sea, the United States considers Canada a close ally, and the dispute does not jeopardize this relationship.29 Unfortunately, the United States is the only Arctic nation that has not joined UNCLOS, despite support from President Barack Obama and the Bush and Clinton administrations. Because the Illulissat Declaration recognizes the law of the sea as the framework for deciding issues of Arctic territoriality, the United States will likely find itself at a disadvantage when critical Arctic conversations occur.30
We also should remember that the United States already has been abiding by the Law of the Sea Convention since President Reagan's 1983 Statement of Oceans Policy. In addition, the United States is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, a predecessor to the Law of the Sea Convention. Many of the provisions of the 1958 Convention are less advantageous to the United States than comparable provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention.
Given that the United States has been abiding by all but one provision of the Treaty for the last 21 years and that we are already a party to a less advantageous international agreement on ocean law, dire predictions about the hazards to our sovereignty of joining the Law of the Sea Convention ring particularly hollow.
Ultimately, the Convention settled on an outer limit for the continental shelf of 200 miles,38 which satisfied many geographically disadvantaged states (those that do have a naturally wide shelf), but also allowed special considerations for states with naturally broad shelves by granting them a potentially deeper shelf of up to 350 miles instead of the standard 200.39 With the exception of the special considerations, Convention provisions limiting the continental shelf echoed those in the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf which set the limit as 200 miles and gave coastal states exclusive rights over its continental shelf.40 The United States is a party to the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf and thus bound by these limits.41 However, if the United States qualifies for the special considerations provided for in the Convention for states with naturally broader shelves, it has the potential to increase its continental shelf.42
U.S. law and practice are already generally compatible with the Convention. Except [with respect to the enforcement of certain deep seabed mining decisions, which would be necessary at some point after U.S. accession], the United States does not need to enact new legislation to supplement or modify existing U.S. law, whether related to protection of the marine environment, human health, safety, maritime security, the conservation of natural resources, or other topics within the scope of the Convention. The United States, as a party, would be able to implement the Convention through existing laws, regulations, and practices (including enforcement practices), which are consistent with the Convention and which would not need to change in order for the United States to meet its Convention obligations….[t]he Convention would not create private rights of action or other enforceable rights in U.S. courts, apart from its provisions regarding privileges and immunities to be accorded to the Convention’s institutions.