Without becoming party to the Convention, the United States cannot benefit from all the Convention offers, while the rest of the world also loses from our non-participation in the continued progressive development ofthe Law of the Sea. The United States cannot turn to the binding dispute settlement regime of Part XV should it wish to contest overly assertive straight baseline claims or arbitrary restrictions on innocent passage or marine scientific research.¹⁶ The United States cannot make a claim for an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76. The United States has also been without representation on the Commission on the Limits ofthe Continental Shelf. The Commission has been quietly developing international law on the continental shelf by formulating its Scientific and Technical Guidelines and by reviewing the dozen or so claims that have so far been made. If and when the United States ever does become a party, its extended continental shelf claim will be assessed, perhaps decades after the Commission began its work, on the basis of standards now being worked out without its participation.

The immediate effect of our failure to sign the Convention was a loss of political capital. Had we been only a peripheral player in the UNCLOS process, or had we objected earlier and more vigorously to certain proposals, our refusal to sign would not have been so conspicuous. Unfortunately, our 25 years of active participation in the process, and our mild objections to the initial deep seabed mining provisions, gave the community of nations every reason to believe we were going to sign and support the Treaty. Our refusal to sign at the end of the process was viewed as a capricious policy reversal, resulting in significant political cost.

This situation was exacerbated by the 1983 Reagan Proclamation, which appeared to the international community as an attempt to mold the Treaty for our own use. We lost significant political credibility with our decision not to sign the Treaty and touched off a further torrent of criticism in the wake of the Presidential statement. Some of the international community refused to accept the U.S. contention that the non-seabed provisions of the Treaty reflected customary law and therefore were applicable to all states, whether or not they were parties to it. As one of the most influential UNCLOS negotiators expressed it: “The provisions of the Convention are closely interrelated and form an integral package. Thus, it is not possible for a state to pick what it likesand disregard what it does not like.”^{10 }

The debate on the Convention would be just an interesting political science case study if it were not for the fact that there are serious consequences to not ratifying it. The Convention comes open for amendment for the first time in November of this year. If the United States is not party to the Convention at that time, we will not have a seat at the table to protect against proposed amendments that would roll back Convention rights we fought hard to achieve.

Some nations may press for restrictions on the movement of naval or commercial vessels near their coastline. Others may pursue the right to exclude nuclear-powered vessels from their territorial waters. (Under the Convention, a ship's propulsion system cannot be used as an argument to restrict its movements.) As a party, we will be in a very strong position to prevent harmful amendments.

In addition, the Convention's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will soon begin making decisions on claims to continental shelf areas that could impact the United States' own claims to the area and resources of our broad continental margin. Russia is already making excessive claims in the Arctic. Unless we are party to the Convention, we will not be able to protect our national interest in these discussions.