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Revision of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS won't help resolve disputes in South China Seas from Sat, 08/16/2014 - 17:11

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Chinese aggressive claims in South China Seas motivated by three strategic goals
China likewise has security interests in its extensive South China Sea claims. As noted above, Beijing has reinterpreted international law to assert that it can deny access to its EEZ by foreign military vessels. Successful realization of China’s claims is the first step toward keeping foreign military assets out of those waters. There are three broad reasons why it wishes to do so. Firstly, sovereignty over the South China Sea would grant China significant, additional strategic depth. At present, from China’s point of view, its coastal cities – key centers of economic activity – are vulnerable to attack from the sea. Keeping foreign warships and military aircraft distant from China’s shores would make it easier for the PLA to defend China’s southern coastline. It would also enable China to more easily project power close to its neighbors’ shores and thus threaten U.S. allies like the Philippines and friends such as Singapore and Indonesia. Second, China is highly dependent on resource imports from the Middle East. In 2010, 47 percent of China’s oil imports came from the Middle East; 30 percent came from Africa[AJH2] . These imports pass through chokepoints that China doesn’t control, notably the Malacca Strait, but also the Lombok and Sunda Straits in Indonesian waters. Chinese defense officials have referred to this situation as the “Malacca dilemma.” Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea would allow it to more easily project power into those straits and, on the flip side, make it more difficult for the United States to do so. This would make it more difficult for the United States to conduct operations in these vital waters against China, while making it easier for China to operate against the United States – and our allies Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It would also enable the Chinese navy to more easily project power into the Indian Ocean, where American and Indian vessels have long operated unimpeded. Third, Chinese control over the South China Sea would make it easier for the PLA Navy to project power into the Pacific Ocean. Such control would, in particular, make it more difficult for the United States to monitor Chinese submarines deploying from their underground base at Hainan Island. A Chinese Navy that can more easily sail into the Pacific is one that can more easily threaten U.S. assets and U.S. territories in the region.
Dan Blumenthal & Michael Mazza. "Why to Forget UNCLOS ." The Diplomat. (February 17, 2012) [ More ]
China attempting to use UNCLOS to bind participants to its interpretation of military activities clause, U.S. should not play along
Traditionally the freedom of the high seas has included the use of the seas for military maneuvers or exercises, including the use of weapons. This freedom – including the freedom to operate in EEZs – was supposed to be incorporated into UNCLOS . But the language in the provisions pertaining to conduct of military activity in EEZs leaves far too much wriggle room for mischief. For example, China says that foreign warships must obtain its approval before they can do anything but pass through its exclusive economic zone. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman, Senior Col. Geng Yansheng, stated in 2010: “We will, in accordance with the demands of international law, respect the freedom of passage of ships or aircraft from relevant countries which are in compliance with international law” (emphasis added). Chinese officials are trying to limit U.S. naval activity in China’s EEZ’s to “passage” from one destination to another. This means that the Chinese are claiming that heretofore lawful activities(task-force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, weapons testing and firing, surveillance and reconnaissance operations and other intelligence-gathering activities, and military marine data collection or military surveys)conducted in EEZs should now be treated as prejudicial to Chinese rights, including China’s duty to protect the marine environment. If these interpretations gain currency, UNCLOS will prove prejudicial to the rights of maritime nations such as the United States. Law should provide clarity, but UNCLOS is unclear as to what military activities are allowed in a country’s EEZ. China is cynically exploiting the law’s vagaries to further its political goals and its desire to project power. Herein lies a major danger in U.S. ratification of UNCLOS. In adopting, promoting, and acting on new interpretations of international law, China is attempting to upset the status quo and establish new norms of maritime behavior. By signing up to UNCLOS, the United States might unintentionally signal approval of these errant interpretations.
Dan Blumenthal & Michael Mazza. "Why to Forget UNCLOS ." The Diplomat. (February 17, 2012) [ More ]
China is resisting multilateral negotiation efforts over South China Seas disputes

The dispute in the South China Sea is even more complex. Drawing on ancient maps and historical accounts, the Chinese and Taiwanese insist that the sea’s two island chains, the Spratlys and the Para- cels, were long occupied by Chinese fisherfolk, and so the entire region belongs to them. The Viet- namese also assert historical ties to the two chains based on long-term fishing activities, while the other littoral states each claim a 200-nautical mile EEZ stretching into the heart of the sea. When com- bined, these various claims produce multiple over- laps, in some instances with three or more states involved—but always including China and Taiwan as claimants. Efforts to devise a formula to resolve the disputes through negotiations sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE- AN) have so far met with failure: While China has offered to negotiate one-on-one with individual states but not in a roundtable with all claimants, the other countries—mindful of China’s greater wealth and power—prefer to negotiate en masse.

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Klare, Michael T. "The Growing Threat of Maritime Conflict." Current History. Vol. 112, No. 750 (January 2013): 26-32. [ More (4 quotes) ]
U.S. Navy's freedom of operation in South China Sea could be more constrained after ratification of UNCLOS

America is the dominant hegemonic Power in Asia Pacific and possesses the dominant power projection38 capabilities in the region and seems committed to continue using them in a restrained manner.39 The littoral counties in the region, especially China, however, are developing the ability to deploy forces with the military capacity to threaten U.S. power projections. In particular, China‘s rapidly increasing economic power has caused widespread concern over China‘s ambitions to enhance ―blue water capability‖ for influence beyond its borders. These developments in China are of special concern to the US national interests, especially in the South-China Sea.40 In this regard, the recent statement by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton41 in the ASEAN Regional Forum caused a lot of diplomatic tensions between the US and China. The said statement referred to the US interests in resolving territorial disputes off China‘s southern coast as ―a leading diplomatic priority,‖ thereby indicating the US intention to intercede in a region.

However, this is not the first time that the US has shown its interest in the maritime affairs in the Asia-pacific region, especially in South China Sea. The 2009 Impeccable incident is reflective of the US intensions to maintain its hegemony through power projections, even by circumventing the marine scientific research (MSR) provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention.

In the light of these observations, the US accession to the LOS Convention will have significant implications for the US interest in the South China Sea. Most notably, the LOS Convention would be applicable to the US completely as it does not allow making reservations at the time of accession. In addition, the US would be obliged to refrain from any acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the convention. Thus, by becoming a party to the Convention, the US would be constrained in the freedom to take inapt actions in the South China Sea without giving due considerations to its possible legal consequences. This may diminish the unchallenged naval power of the US in the Asia-Pacific.

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Kumar, Sunil Agarwal. Prospects of a Paradigm Shift in the American Policy Towards UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Potential Implications . National Maritime Foundation: , April 15, 2011. [ More (7 quotes) ]

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