First and foremost, China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to arctic resources, sea-lanes, and governance. this entitlement relies on various justifications. as a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by arctic warming, a permanent member of the UN security Council, and the world’s most populous state, China sees its role in arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral Yin Zhuo made this point in March 2010, proclaiming that “the arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.”⁸⁵ similarly, in 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that arctic countries should “ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the common interests of the international community.”⁸⁶ Hu, it seems, was advising the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes of the arctic.

China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNCLOS to argue that the arctic and its resources are the “common heritage of all humankind” and do not belong exclusively to the arctic five.⁸⁷ In reality, “common heritage” in UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNClos as the area that lies beyond EEZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented,⁸⁸ percent of the arctic seabed would likely fall under their combined sovereign EEZ jurisdictions, with the small “doughnut hole” in the center qualifying as the common heritage.88 since, however, most of the resource wealth in the arctic lies within these claims, China perpetuates the notion that the entire arctic ocean is the common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there.⁸⁹ this sort of “lawfare,” or misuse of the “law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective,” is an essential component of China’s strategy, enabling the PRC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-arctic state through asymmetrical means.⁹⁰