According to the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” currently in effect, the Arctic does not belong to any country. In addition to the five circum-Arctic countries Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, many [other] countries have proclaimed partial sovereignty over the Arctic. At present there is no Arctic country which has clearly proven that its continental shelf extends into the Arctic, and because of this the Arctic is regarded as an “international area” and is supervised and managed by the Inter- national Seabed Authority. Some countries are contending for Arctic sovereignty, and this is tantamount to infringing upon the interests of the other countries of the world. In facing this real and quite unpredictable “scramble and battle for the Arctic” and the probability of some countries dividing up the [Arctic] melon with the aid of geographical advantage and military might, if peaceful means cannot produce the anticipated effects, war becomes the only method for resolving the issue. Based on this, it is not difficult for us to imagine that the probability of the future outbreak of war in the Arctic is very high, and that as soon as war breaks out, the United States, Russia, and Canada will be its main principals.

While Arctic coastal states will play a dominant role in the Arctic, non-Arctic states that benefit from Arctic hydrocarbons and ice-free shipping routes will also seek a role. China, in particular, has focused financial, scientific, and political capital in the Arctic. As the world’s largest shipping nation, with 46 percent of gross domestic product40 derived from the shipping industry, China is aware that any changes to world shipping routes will have “a direct impact on [its]...economy and potential trade with respect to both imports and exports.”41 China is concerned that “the advantage of the Arctic routes would substantially decrease if Russia were to unilaterally charge exorbitant service fees for ships passing through its EEZ waters”42 and thus is advocating strong international cooperation within multilateral governing structures. In response to future Arctic opportunities, China has built the world’s largest non-nuclear-powered icebreaker, Xuelong (Snow Dragon), which has completed four scientific expeditions to the Arctic Circle to conduct oceanographic surveys and scientific research.43 In September 2010, the Polar Institute of China concluded an agreement on polar research cooperation with the Norwegian Polar Institute, to which China will contribute advanced instruments and laboratories, and will build a research center and a new ice- class research vessel.44 China has already engaged Canada in bilateral meetings to confront poten- tial issues that could arise from the changing Arctic environment; it is also eager to build relations with the Nordic countries in hopes of establishing cooperation between Chinese and Norwegian companies in extracting Arctic energy resources.

Yet China faces a further obstacle to participation in arctic affairs, in the form of competition with other non-arctic states. Prominent among those countries vying for admission to the arctic Council as permanent observers are India, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and a number of individual european states. the growing arctic interests of these states demonstrate that the race to the High North has truly become global, adding to the complexity of arctic geopolitics. Notably, India, already a competitor with China in South Asia, has established a formidable arctic research program of its own, including a permanent research station in the Svalbard archipelago and numerous research expeditions.⁷⁹ but while the council may expand to admit a few of these states as observers, it is unlikely that many will gain seats, since present members are wary of seeing their own influence diminished.⁸⁰ Moreover, China, it seems, is not highly favored for accession, as indicated by a January 2011 survey of public opinion in the eight arctic states that found that “China is the least attractive partner to all current arctic Council countries [save for Russia].”⁸¹ these factors will tend to intensify Chinese relations with other non-arctic states as Beijing fights to have a say in arctic affairs.

China, the European Union, or other member states could also attempt to amend UNCLOS in ways that could change the favorable extended continental shelf and deep seabed mining regimes, or give coastal states more control beyond their territorial seas and potentially obstruct the freedoms to navigate and to lay and maintain international cables. Without access to UNCLOS procedures, the United States loses the force of its objections and risks being a bystander as Member States effectively amend customary international law through UNCLOS amendments.²⁰⁵

In the years to come, will China continue to support a legal regime in the Arctic that excludes China from the vast majority of the Arctic’s seafloor resources? And if China finds the UNCLOS seafloor regime constricting and employs its considerable influence and financial strength to lobby for offshore investment or for a new approach, will other states without Arctic coastlines follow suit? Calls for an Arctic treaty are not new,²⁰⁶ and given China’s interests, such an effort would hardly be surprising.²⁰⁷ If such a movement were to arise, it is difficult to argue that the United States would be in a stronger position to resist change as an uncommitted outsider rather than a full-fledged member state.