Military officers serving as members on the United States delegation that negotiated the Convention ensured that it contained a military activities exemption from dispute resolution, which is ironclad. The Convention they helped craft permits a maritime nation, like the United States, to use compulsory dispute resolution as a sword against foreign coastal state encroachment while simultaneously shielding military activities from review. Given the central importance of this issue, it is important to review the compulsory dispute resolution procedures contained in Part XV, Section 2 of the Convention, and explain, in detail, how Article 298 of the Law of the Sea Convention, under its express terms, will permit the United States to completely exempt its military activities from dispute resolution, and prevent any opposing State or court or tribunal from reviewing our determination that an activity is an exempted military activity. Part XV, Section 2 of the Convention is titled, “Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions.” Section 2 is comprised of eleven Articles (286 – 296), which contain the compulsory dispute resolution procedures that some are concerned could be used to effect a review of our military activities. Section 2 begins with Article 286, which provides that, except as provided in Section 3 of the Part XV, “any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to Section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.” Article 287 then provides the choice of procedure election. The President has asked the Senate to reject the first two choices available, the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and instead choose arbitration (what are referred to formally as arbitral tribunals). Now, let’s move on to Section 3, which is titled, “Section 3. Limitations and Exceptions to Applicability of Section 2.” In Section 3 we find Article 298; and in Article 298, subparagraph 1, it states in pertinent part:

1. When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may...declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes...”

There then follows three categories of disputes: Maritime boundary disputes, disputes involving military activities, and disputes involving matters before the United Nations Security Council. The president has asked the Senate to exempt all three categories. The key language from Article 298.1 is: “A State may declare that it ... does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2.” It is the right of the State, and solely the State, to completely and preemptively reject all of the dispute resolution procedures provided for in Section 2. It is those very procedures that the opposing State or international court or tribunal would have to rely upon to try to assert authority over us. It simply does not get any better than that---not in private contract law nor in treaty law. What this Convention makes clear is that a State party can completely reject all the dispute resolution procedures—on its own terms—for disputes involving maritime boundaries, military activities, and matters before the Security Council. There is simply no process or procedure whereby our determination can be subject to review, because we have already preemptively rejected all the procedures provided for in Section 2, including article 287 (choice of forum), article 288 (the right of a court or tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction), article 290 (provisional measures) and article 292 (prompt release). All permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (except the United States) and numerous other countries have taken the military activities exemption. They, like us, would never accept a court or tribunal acting ultra vires---beyond the limits of the Convention itself.