Arctic
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However, even if the United States decides to ratify the treaty, there is still an inherent structural problem that may prevent the UNCLOS from solving disputes of any magnitude. This structural problems is that nations may opt-out of the UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures.134 In fact, every Arctic nation except Norway has chosen this method to avoid the binding language of the UNCLOS.135 The treaty’s substance hardly matters if there is no way to enforce its provisions.
Additionally, UNCLOS contains specific provisions for extended Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) claims. Besides massive deposits of oil and gas, the Arctic contains major mineral deposits such as nickel, iron ore, tin, uranium, copper, and other rare earth minerals. Every Arctic nation is accessing locations and methods to extract these resources.224 In the massive land grab for natural resource rich areas that has been going on between the other seven Arctic nations, the U.N. as detailed in UNLCOS is the arbiter. As a non-party, the U.S. is left out in the cold with respect to OCS claims. The OCS is rich in natural resources and opportunities for positive economic impact. According to the U.S. Geological Service, the U.S. Arctic contains 29.96 billion barrels of oil and 72 billion barrels of natural gas (about 33 percent of technically recoverable oil and 18 percent of technically recoverable gas in the entire Arctic).225 Although the U.S. abides by the rules of UNCLOS without having ratified it, it trails behind the remainder of the Arctic states on its policy and in asserting its presence in the region.226 Signing and ratifying UNCLOS, like Canada, would prove to be an excellent framework for shaping U.S. Arctic policy and advancing the current blueprint for the region.
Some may argue that U.S. does not need UNCLOS due to the Arctic Council and the active role the U.S. has taken. Despite raising awareness about Arctic issues, the Arctic Council lacks any regulatory authority or the power to address military issues.227 As a result, the Arctic Council is limited in overall effectiveness and accession to UNCLOS is a better avenue to assert U.S. sovereignty in the region.
Second, when Russia’s security moves in the Arctic are placed in the context of the nation’s larger trend to reform and modernize its armed forces, they appear less grandiose. In 2008, Russia embarked on one of the most ambitious military reforms, reorganization, and equipment modernization programs in its history, in which the Arctic is but one component. The plans call for more than 20 trillion rubles ($650 billion) by 2020 to completely overhaul its military hardware so that “by 2015, the proportion of the new generation of weapons should be 30 percent, and by 2020 reach 70-100 percent.”15 In contrast to other post-Soviet efforts, the current program has considerable political will behind it as evidenced by overall military spending in 2012 increasing by 24 percent – a jump of nearly $90 billion or 113 percent from 2003 military expenditures.16 Military spending is envisioned to jump 18 percent in 2014 and 60 percent from 2014-2016. The defense budget portion of the Russian GDP is envisioned to grow from 3.1 percent in 2012 to 3.9 percent in 2016.