Evidence: Recently Added
The U.S. currently regulates certain industrial facilities such as seafood processing vessels, aquaculture facility discharges, and offshore oil and gas operations under the permitting requirements of Sections 402 and 403 of the Clean Water Act. The U.S. also regulates certain cruise ship operations in the waters around Alaska. Additional measures will likely be necessary to address environmental issues arising from other industrial activities on vessels.
UNCLOS, if interpreted too narrowly, could constrain the United States’ ability to adopt and enforce these important measures. As noted earlier, Article 21.2 imposes limits on laws and regulations relating to “innocent passage.” Article 211 also raises similar issues. We urge the Senate to include an interpretive statement on this issue as part of its advice and consent, to be included with the instrument of accession. The statement must clarify that these vessels are not engaging in or innocent passage as defined in Articles 18 and 19, and that the U.S. is free to regulate vessels operating in a capacity other than innocent passage as necessary to protect against polluting discharges from these vessels.
The vision of UNCLOS as a constitution was introduced at the beginning of this testimony, and it must be revisited here. As a constitution, UNCLOS is not meant to be an inflexible, stagnant document. Rather, its provisions must be interpreted over time, and its processes applied to our expanding environmental awareness about our world’s oceans and the resources within them. In fact, subsequent multilateral environmental agreements have both reaffirmed and expanded upon UNCLOS’s regime for the marine environment.13
The United States will be in a better position to address the existing deficiencies or limitations in the rule of law for the oceans if it becomes a signatory to UNCLOS. In its 1998 joint statement, which provides the basis for my next remarks, the environmental community urged the United States to embrace its leadership role in the world by ensuring that UNCLOS serves as a framework for securing more protective regimes for the conservation of marine ecosystems and wildlife. This role must continue beyond accession to participation and negotiation for improved international environmental practices over time. I would like to take this opportunity to briefly mention a few of these emerging and important issues.
Yet China faces a further obstacle to participation in arctic affairs, in the form of competition with other non-arctic states. Prominent among those countries vying for admission to the arctic Council as permanent observers are India, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and a number of individual european states. the growing arctic interests of these states demonstrate that the race to the High North has truly become global, adding to the complexity of arctic geopolitics. Notably, India, already a competitor with China in South Asia, has established a formidable arctic research program of its own, including a permanent research station in the Svalbard archipelago and numerous research expeditions.79 but while the council may expand to admit a few of these states as observers, it is unlikely that many will gain seats, since present members are wary of seeing their own influence diminished.80 Moreover, China, it seems, is not highly favored for accession, as indicated by a January 2011 survey of public opinion in the eight arctic states that found that “China is the least attractive partner to all current arctic Council countries [save for Russia].”81 these factors will tend to intensify Chinese relations with other non-arctic states as Beijing fights to have a say in arctic affairs.
Opponents are similarly reluctant to mention the unanimous support of affected U.S. industries. To oppose the treaty on economic grounds requires opponents to say that the oil, natural gas, shipping, fishing, boat manufacturing, exporting, and telecommunications industries do not understand their own bottom lines. It requires opponents to say that this diverse set of industries is spending money and time lobbying on behalf of an outcome that will be disadvantageous to their own interests.
The vast majority of conservative Republicans would support, in prospect, a generic measure that expands the ability of American oil and natural gas companies to drill for resources in new areas, solidifies the Navy's rights to traverse the oceans, enshrines U.S. economic sovereignty over our Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 miles off our shore, helps our ocean industries create jobs, and reduces the prospects that Russia will be successful in claiming excessive portions of the Arctic. All of these conservative-backed outcomes would result from U.S. ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention. Yet the treaty is being blocked because of ephemeral conservative concerns that boil down to a discomfort with multi-lateralism.
The fact that these concerns have been allowed to sideline the treaty for ten years is a bad sign for U.S. foreign policy in an age of terrorism. If we cannot get beyond political paralysis in a case where the coalition of American supporters is so comprehensive, there is little reason to think that any multi-lateral solution to any international problem is likely to be accepted within the U.S. policy-making structure.
Eventually, however, I believe that the United States will become a party to the Convention because events will transpire that will brightly illuminate the costs of not ratifying it. At some point, a foreign nation will seek rule changes to the treaty that restrict passage by U.S. Navy vessels. At some point, our oil and mining industries will want to prospect beyond the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. They won't do that without the international legal certainty provided by the Law of the Sea that their claims and investments will be respected by other nations. At some point, Russia or some other country will succeed in having excessive ocean claims recognized because we are not there to stop them.
My message today is that it is irresponsible for us to wait to ratify the Law of the Sea until we feel the negative consequences of our absence from the Convention. The Senate should ratify the Law of the Sea Convention now in the interest of U.S. national security, the U.S. economy, and the American people.
One year later, many of those same foreign CNOs were asked to respond to Admiral Mullen’s plan for a new US maritime strategy.74 Once again, interna- tional law figured prominently in several of the responses. The Commandant of the Brazilian Navy urged that the new strategy “be guided by principles sanctioned by international law,” a viewed shared by the Secretary General of the Peruvian Navy and the Portuguese Navy Chief of Staff. Their counterpart in Colombia emphasized the need for an “international legal mechanism of cooper- ation.” Uruguay’s reply was also directly on point: “Multilateral cooperation among navies is legitimate activity when it is based on the law.” The Commander of the Lebanese Navy cited the 1982 LOS Convention and cautioned against the United States acting alone, while the new Chief of Staff for the Spanish Navy highlighted the need for the US Navy “to operate alongside its allies in accordance with international law.” The Australian Maritime Doctrine elegantly and forcefully captures the central importance of law and legitimacy for one of America’s most respected partners:
Australia’s use of armed force must be subject to the test of legitimacy, in that the Government must have the capacity to demonstrate to the Parliament and the electorate that there is adequate moral and legal justification for its actions . . . . [T]his adherence to legitimacy and the democratic nature of the Australian nation state is a particular strength. It is a historical fact that liberal democracies have been more successful in the development and operation of maritime forces than other forms of government, principally because the intensity and complexity of the sustained effort required for these capabilities places heavy demands upon a nation’s systems of state credit, its technological and industrial infrastructure, and its educated population. Sophisticated combat forces, in other words, depend directly upon the support of the people for their continued existence.75
Admiral Harry Ulrich, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, espouses a relatively simple formula for the global war on terrorism: have more partners than your ad- versaries have. The reasons are elementary. The struggle against disorder knows no flag. Waging that struggle has become a team sport. Vice Admiral Morgan has been the leading voice for the 1,000-ship multinational navy/Global Maritime Partner- ship, a concept designed to attract the kind of partners Admiral Ulrich seeks. Does the Global Maritime Partnership (and the Global Fleet Station initiative70) need a unifying global maritime strategy that promises to respect the rules of interna- tional law? Many of the potential 1,000-ship-navy partners think so.71
In their response to the November 2005 “1,000 Ship Navy” article by Admirals Morgan and Martoglio,72 the naval commanders of France, Ghana, India, Portugal and Spain all referred to the rule of law or legal considerations.73 The French com- mander, for example, observed that any 1,000-ship-navy operations must be “in full compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . .” Portugal ex- pressly referred to the “rule of law,” and India asked whether the 1,000-ship con- cept should be established under the aegis of the United Nations. Admiral Soto of the Spanish Navy observed that “[t]ogether we must find a legal solution to pre- serving the natural flow of friendly maritime trade while denying freedom of action to those criminals who attempt to use the maritime space for illegal activities.” It seems clear that respect for international law has the potential to unite or fracture the embryonic 1,000-ship navy.
In economic terms, Pike stressed that advances in technology have dramatically impacted the impor- tance of acceding to the Convention, particularly in terms of the nation’s economic security. Furthermore, he believes the treaty under consideration today is perceived far differently than it was when amended in 1994, just as the Internet was being introduced to the world.
“Now, we’ve got 95 percent of all of our Internet traffic, whether it’s orders for widgets, whether it’s science or military, all of this information travels on undersea cables, and we basically have no protection over those,” he said, illustrating why telecommunications giants like AT&T and Verizon, as well as the North American Submarine Cable Association, are among vocal advocates on Capitol Hill pushing for ratification. “These organizations strongly support the treaty because it affords us unfettered ability to lay and maintain these undersea cables, but undersea cables were sort of an afterthought in 1982.
Supporters of the Convention do not disagree that China’s ongoing assertiveness to territory on and beneath the South China Sea is cause for concern, if not a challenge to international norms regarding freedom of the seas, said Caitlyn Antrim, executive director of the Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans, a nonpartisan educational group whose purpose is to inform public discourse regarding U.S. interests in accession to the Convention.
Antrim noted, however, that the United States could better help the situation by acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention, whereby it would have more influence in supporting the coastal states in that region.
An area of 650,000 square miles with a sea floor believed to be rich in deposits of oil and gas, and host to the world’s second busiest sea lanes, the South China Sea is an example of “creeping jurisdiction,” said Antrim, which is represented, in the case of China, by an attempt to increase its control and extend its authority at the expense of its neighbors in Southeast Asia, as well as the United States, Japan and South Korea.
“The Law of the Sea is our lever,” she told Seapower. “We can’t go in there and continually force our way. We need to have a legal regime so that everything works smoothly. All of the other countries support the Law of the Sea, and we get to add to that strength, but it’s a little difficult when we aren’t a party to it.”
At issue, in light of China’s emergence as an economic power, technology leader and a nation with a defined oceans strategy, and the activity of Russia and others in the Arctic region, are serious concerns that the United States is falling behind by not securing its sovereign rights to the vast resources of its continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore — and to explore for more around the world — matters that encompass economic losses as well as national security threats.
Proponents, largely within industry, are anxious to see the United States accede to the Convention. In doing so, the country gains the legal authority to sponsor U.S. companies eager to secure rights to oil and gas reserves, and to leverage investments upwards of $2 billion for mining deep seabeds for valuable metals and rare earth elements. More than 40 countries have begun the process of securing their own continental shelf rights, according to State Depart- ment data.
“Chinese, Indian and Russian companies are exploring deep seabeds for rare earth elements and valuable metals, but the United States cannot sponsor our companies to do the same,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a videotaped statement last December to the Pew Business Roundtable. “Joining the Convention will level the playing field for American companies so they have the same rights and opportunities as their competitors.”