Evidence: Recently Added
A major attack on deep-water drilling infrastructure could have many immediate effects, but two stand out. First, the environmental damage could be devastating. Residents around the Gulf of Mexico are still feeling the repercussions of the 2010 explosion on BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig, and the cleanup costs have already reached into the tens of billions. Yet Deepwater Horizon was only one of thousands of production platforms and drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, many of which belong to vast networks of undersea wells, pumps, and valves connected by thousands of miles of pipeline.
Second, an attack could cause a major disruption in global energy supplies. About one-third of global oil production now occurs offshore, with the largest fields in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Onshore facilities along the Gulf Coast that are connected to sea-based ports by submarine pipelines account for over 40 percent of total U.S. oil-refining capacity and over 30 percent of U.S. natural-gas-processing capacity. Both in the United States and elsewhere, oil companies have increasingly ventured into deep and ultradeep water (greater than 1,000 and 5,000 feet, respectively). Over the past decade, global investment in offshore oil and gas infrastructure has steadily increased, from about $100 billion to over $300 billion annually. The estimated volume of newly discovered oil and gas reserves in deep water now exceeds that onshore and in shallow water. And by 2035, forecasts suggest, deep-water wells will account for 11 percent of total global production, up from six percent in 2013.
Much of this infrastructure allows the global economy to function. Every day, SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, transmits some 20 million messages to more than 8,000 banking organizations, security institutions, and corporate customers in nearly 200 countries, reconciling trillions of dollars’ worth of assets across global financial markets. Intercontinental Exchange, which operates a global network of currency exchanges and clearing-houses, typically processes over ten million contracts each day, covering the energy, commodity, financial, and equity derivatives markets. Without the undersea fiber-optic network, this type of electronic banking and commerce simply could not happen. And in the event that the cable system shut down, millions of transactions would be cut short.
As a result, companies, governments, and individuals can send and receive more data than ever before. In 1993, Internet users transmitted around 100 terabits of data in a year; today, they send about 150 terabits every second. And this number is expected to exceed 1,000 terabits by 2020, fueled in large part by the expansion of cellular networks in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
Nearly all that data will travel along the seabed. Imagine, then, how damaging a determined attack on undersea infrastructure could be. One need only consider the destruction possible from natural causes and inadvertent interference. In 2006, an undersea earthquake near Taiwan snapped nine cables. It took 11 ships 49 days to finish repairs, while China, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam lost critical communication links, disrupting regional banking, markets, and trade. In 2007, Vietnamese fishermen seeking to salvage copper from a defunct coaxial cable pulled up active lines instead, disrupting Vietnam’s communications with Hong Kong and Thailand for nearly three months and requiring repairs that cost millions. Given the scarcity of equipment and personnel, it could take months, if not years, for the United States to recover from a large-scale, coordinated assault. Attackers wouldn’t even need to target U.S. assets, since U.S. traffic flows through more than a dozen other countries that serve as major hubs for the global undersea cable network.
Moscow’s preoccupation with the Arctic is understandable as the region is much more significant for Russia’s present and future economic vitality than it is for any other Arctic nation. The Arctic accounts for approximately 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and 22 percent of total Russian exports. Over 90 percent of its nickel and cobalt, 60 percent of its copper, and 96 percent of its platinoids come from Arctic mines. The melting ice exposes the vast amount of hydrocarbon wealth of the Arctic basin. According to figures published by the Institute of Oil and Gas Problems, Russia will be pumping up to 30 million tons of oil and 130 billion m3 of natural gas out of its Arctic shelf by 2030.23 In addition to hydrocarbon wealth, the Arctic offers lucrative transportation routes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) extends across the Arctic Ocean seas (Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi) off the Russian Arctic coast and is the shortest route from Europe to the Far East. Furthermore, receding ice exposes Russia’s largely unmanned and unmonitored 17,500 kilometer coastline to piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling.
Medvedev’s decision to link the Arctic with Russia’s feeling of being wronged in the former Soviet space is especially intriguing, as Kremlin policymakers likely view both regions in similar terms. Russia’s preoccupation with peripheral buffer zones goes back centuries, with the post-Soviet struggle for influence in its self-proclaimed “near abroad” being the most recent manifestation. In 2006, Russian military commentator O. Litkova went so far as to argue that “the Arctic could significantly compensate Russia for the losses she suffered as a result of the collapse of the USSR.”44 The Arctic, like the near abroad, is viewed in terms of sectorial divisions in which Russia believes that history and geography afford it exclusive right of influence. In the case of the Arctic, this belief stretches back at least to the Soviet’s 1926 decree in which all territories within the extreme meridians of Russia’s eastern and western borders running to the North Pole were claimed as Russian.
Russia fears that the ice melt will do to the Arctic what the fall of communism did in Eastern Europe, that is, usher in a period of NATO encroachment into their traditional space. In 2011, two leading academic voices in Russia opined:
Officials and experts agree that NATO continues on a course toward enhancing its activity in the Arctic. What consequence will this have on Russia? In all aspects – negative…. With regard to the fierce competition for Arctic resources, NATO will squeeze Russia out, just as it squeezes Russia in other regions of Europe in the sphere of security. It is obvious that the USA, which is not party to [UNCLOS] will use NATO to strengthen its position in the region….Therefore, Russia should prepare for a difficult and long battle for the settling of its interest and legal rights.45
There is significant danger in relying so heavily on customary international law to support U.S. desires, and especially to guarantee the movement of our naval expeditionary forces. Customary law is inherently "fuzzy around the edges" and vague on details. This customary law is constantly evolving through a process of claim and counter claim,55 representing an inherently unstable landscape. Some states, especially newly indepen- dent states, do not recognize customary law. They view it as a body of law, frequently formed without their participation or consent, that promotes the interests of developed nations—often former colonial powers—without considering and reflecting those of the developing world56. Finally, customary law is especially difficult to enforce and maintain, requiring, for example, the comprehensive U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program to maintain57 the United States' desired level of freedom of navigation and overflight.
Legal scholars have noted that governments are more inclined to respect obligations to which formal consent has been given by the highest political authorities and that even if the Convention is declaratory of customary international law, this leaves much room for argument about important details. They further argue that without widespread ratification of the Convention, inevitable "violations" are more easily interpreted as evi- dence that state practice, the ultimate source of customary law, is not necessarily rooted 58 in the Convention.
Naval expeditionary forces are also often required to demonstrate naval presence. A significant percentage of naval forces are forward deployed continuously. Such deploy- ments are designed to underwrite regional stability by demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and friends and promote joint and combined training among friendly forces. They also gain U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments and provide initial capabilities for timely response to crisis. It is likely that in the years ahead, our naval21 activities will occur more and more in the littoral regions of the world.
The importance of overseas presence was demonstrated in October 1994, when Iraqi Republican Guard divisions began significant movements towards the border with Kuwait. Forward deployed U.S. naval expeditionary forces, centered around the George Washington Battle Group, sortied from the Mediterranean and entered the Red Sea en route to the Persian Gulf less than 2 days after the request for additional forces was made by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. Additionally, five maritime prepositioned ships at Diego Garcia and U.S. Army ships located in the Western Pacific22 and Indian Ocean proceeded to the gulf as well.
Here again, the Convention helps these naval expeditionary forces achieve impor- tant objectives. In addition to these provisions on passage, the Convention strengthens our ability to operate in these forward areas by providing agreed rules on delimitation of23 24 maritime zones, by preserving high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, including25 within the exclusive economic zone of coastal states, and by recognizing the special nature of military ships and aircraft in reaffirming the doctrine of sovereign26 immunity.
A fifth reason arguing for United States accession to the Convention is our position as a world leader. In light of its diverse maritime uses and interests, the United States is unquestionably the world's leading maritime power. Clearly, U.S. refusal to ultimately accede to a Convention widely regarded as one of the most important agreements ever negotiated would raise fundamental questions regarding not only the future legal regime applicable to the world's oceans, but also the leadership of the United States with re- spect to the promotion of international law and order. The regime of the Law of the Sea Convention presents a superb opportunity for the Untied States to provide world leader- ship in an area of increasing importance to the community of nations. Most importantly, by remaining outside the Convention, the United States would not be in a position to influence the Convention's further development and interpretation as it goes through a critical period of transition and refinement.
A fourth reason arguing for the importance of the Convention to our national security equation is the growing political and military costs of the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program in the face of new excessive maritime claims by an increasing number of states. This program, initiated in 1979 by the Carter Administration, and continued by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, combines diplomatic action and operational assertion of our navigational rights to discourage state claims inconsistent with13 international law as reflected in the Convention. On the diplomatic front, the U.S. State Department protests maritime claims that are inconsistent with international law. Since the inception of this program, well over 100 such protests have been filed by the United14 States. Over the same time period, U.S. military ships and aircraft have exercised navigational rights and freedoms in all oceans against excessive claims of more than 5015 countries with numerous operational assertions every year. Clearly, the scope of this program alone makes it highly desirable for the United States to decrease the number of contentious ocean issues. Moreover, the political costs and military risks of such unilat- eral actions have been high in the past and can only increase in a changing world order.
Closely connected with this first factor is the use of naval forces to protect our core interests. Achieving a stable and predictable regime for the world's oceans, with each nation respecting universally agreed rules and procedures, is vital for the effective use of expeditionary forces as instruments of national policy. Without international respect for the freedoms of navigation and overflight set forth in the Convention, the mobility of our military forces could be jeopardized. The response time for U.S. and allied or coalition forces based away from potential areas of conflict could increase. Forces could arrive on the scene too late to make a difference, affecting our ability to influence the course of events consistent with our interests and treaty obligations. For example, if prevented from transiting through the Indonesian Archipelago and Malaccan Straits, a carrier battle group transiting from Yokosuka, Japan, to Bahrain would have to reroute around Australia. Assuming a steady 15-knot pace, a 6-ship, conventionally powered battle group would require an additional 15 days and over 94,000 gallons of fuel to transit the additional 5800 nautical miles. The additional fuel cost alone would amount to $3 million."