Evidence: Most Popular
Nations have already attempted to use the Law of the Sea Treaty's environmental provisions to affect the environmental policies of others. In 1999, Australia and New Zealand appealed to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to shut down Japan's experimental southern blue fin tuna fishing program, citing Articles 64 and 116-119. Although the Tribunal ultimately decided that it lacked jurisdiction in the case, Australia and New Zealand did gain a temporary injunction on the program.36 More recently, Ireland sought ITLOS's help in forcing the United Kingdom to abandon its planned opening of the Sellafield MOX plant, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in northern eastern England, arguing that it would contribute to pollution of the North Sea. Although ITLOS did not rule in Ireland's favor, it ordered both Ireland and the United Kingdom to enter into consultations.37
Advocates of the treaty also argue that Law of the Sea Treaty merely maintains the status quo for submarines passing through territorial waters because the United States is already a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which, they contend, contains similar language.11 U.S. submarines have traversed territorial waters while submerged over the past 48 years, they say, largely unaffected by the Territorial Sea Convention's surfacing requirement.
Where submarines are concerned, they appear to be correct.
But Article 20 also adds something completely new: The requirement that "other underwater vehicles" navigate on the surface.12 The surfacing requirement would thus presumably apply to Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) and Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles (ROVs), among others (including, presumably, the next generation of such vessels) for the first time.
AUVs, unmanned underwater drones, and ROVs, underwater vehicles controlled by operators at the surface, have numerous military applications, including mine detection and neutralization, surveillance and inspection of underwater installations and topography, among others.13
Some of these activities are otherwise consistent with the Law of the Sea Treaty's definition of "innocent passage." An AUV or ROV used to detect mines to protect a ship exercising its right of innocent passage, for example, appears to meet the requirement that it engage only in activities with "direct bearing on passage." But because these vehicles must be submerged to be used effectively they would be considered "prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the state" by doing so, even though advancing the peace, good order and security is precisely the purpose for which they would be used.
If the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Treaty, the use of AUVs and ROVs for these and other purposes could be reduced.
Similarly, Iran sees the necessity of negating key U.S. advantages in the global commons as critical to success in any military engagement with the United States. Consequently, Iran is working to modernize and augment its arsenal of A2/AD capabilities and refine its methods to debilitate U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. Iran has a significant mine-laying capability, which presents a threat to larger commercial and military vessels navigating the narrow passageways of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These anti-ship mines could effectively slow the ships to make them easy targets for attack by land- and sea-based weaponry. The Iranian navy also fields small surface combatants armed with ASCMs and small boats loaded with small arms ranging from man-portable surface-to-air missiles to heavy machine guns and rifles." These capabilities, particularly mines, can present a significant threat to a modern fleet in the shallow, narrow, semi-enclosed waters of the Persian Gulf. Indeed, Iranian leaders can rely upon relatively low-tech weaponry to combat more advanced U.S. forces, especially if they can maintain the element of surprise. However, the presence of anti-ship mines and small boats that may conduct suicide attacks are not only of concern to the United States. Over 90 percent of Persian Gulf oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz,32 making it a strategic chokepoint whose disruption would have severe consequences for the global economy. Even absent a crisis, this increasing militarization of a waterway that is so critical to global resource distribution is a concern for the international community and a threat to maritime security.
In 2003, Barry Posen wrote a seminal piece on the defense and security benefits of unchallenged freedom of operation in the commons entitled, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony."" Posen argues that dominance in these shared domains serves as the foundation of the leadership role that the United States holds in the international system. He states, "Command of the commons is the key enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies." Posen's work on this topic brought to the forefront the role that the global commons play as a key enabler of U.S. defense and national security strategies.
Launched in 2003, “the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”70 The PSI is not a treaty, but instead relies on preexisting international legal frameworks – including the Law of the Sea Convention – and voluntary commitment to a “Statement of Interdiction Principles” to guide cooperation and prevent proliferation.71,72 Despite the endorsement of ninety-eight nations, major players have proved wary to join the United States in this partnership.73,74,75
Conspicuously absent from PSI are both Indonesia and Malaysia who both border the worlds busiest maritime straight. With nearly 525 million metric tons traveling this corridor annually, the failure to expand PSI to this SLOC puts international interdiction efforts at a significant disadvantage and complicates an already difficult problem in the PACOM AOR.76 This failure to expand PSI should come as no surprise, however. As former Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Walsh testified"Statement of Admiral Patrick M. Walsh: Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention ." Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 27, 2007. [ More (4 quotes) ] to in 2007, many critical Pacific countries would like to support PSI, but are unable to “convince their legislatures that PSI interdiction activities will only occur in accordance with international law, including the Law of the Sea Convention, when the leading PSI nation, the United States, refuse to become a party to the Convention.”77 The legitimacy obtained through ratification of UNCLOS would solve this problem immediately. Recruiting countries to PSI is just the first step, however, as enhanced legitimacy has second-order effects.