Evidence: Most Popular
Highlighting the Arctic’s growing global importance, a number of countries with no geo- graphical links to the Arctic region but with important commercial and economic interests, such as China, South Korea, and the European Union, want to have a voice in future Arctic delibera- tions. France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have been granted “permanent observer” status on the Arctic Council, and China is considered an “ad hoc observer.” Only Arctic Council member states have voting rights, and therefore “ad hoc observer” status does not differ from “permanent observer” with regard to the influence on the decision- making process in ministerial meetings. However, “ad hoc observer” status requires that nation to apply to be admitted to each Arctic Council meeting. The European Union’s application to become a “permanent observer” was blocked in 2009 by Arctic Council member Canada in response to the European Union’s ban on the importation of seal products. This example illustrates the chal- lenges of relying on the current structure of the Arctic Council for balanced and objective rulings, which often fall victim to paralyzing squabbles and the partial leveraging of national interests. On the other hand, the Arctic Five excludes nations and indigenous peoples with legitimate interests in the region, compromising its international credibility as a comprehensive governing arrange- ment. As rifts among international governance institutions continue to emerge, to the detriment of regional policy cohesiveness, the U.S. government must clarify how it wishes to primarily proceed with its multilateral Arctic engagement, either principally through the Arctic 5 ad hoc process or through the more institutionalized Arctic Council’s effort.
Despite the slowdown, Russia continues to increase its military presence in the Arctic. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 stresses the importance of strengthening border guard forces in the region and updating their equipment, while creating a new unit of military forces to “ensure military security under various military-political circumstances.”78 Russia’s assertive rhetoric has been matched by a range of steps that stake its military prominence in the Arctic by developing its coastal defense infrastructure and enhancing its technology capa- bilities, which have been perceived by its Arctic neighbors as provocative and controversial. For example, Russia fired cruise missiles over the Arctic in a summer 2007 exercise; reinforced its Northern Fleet in order to perform additional exercises in the summer of 2008; tested new electronic equipment and precision weapons; and resumed Arctic patrols for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Several times during the past two years U.S. and NATO jets have shadowed Russian bombers close to the Norwegian and Alaskan coasts, particularly during and after the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008.
The United States must take some very concrete steps over the next several years to improve its strategic posture in the Arctic so that over the next 40 years the region is a model of regional coop- eration and not a zone of potential conflict.
The most vital step the United States must take immediately is ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides the necessary guidance and appropriate frame- work to resolve claims to an extended continental shelf in the Arctic region. To prepare itself for ratification, the United States must continue to invest funds in Arctic scientific research and explo- ration in preparation for submitting U.S. claims for extended territorial boundaries. The Obama Administration must make UNCLOS ratification a legislative priority (amongst many other competing priorities) and achieve Senate ratification as soon as possible. Should the U.S. remain outside of UNCLOS for the foreseeable future, it will find itself in a growing strategic disadvantage in shaping future policy outcomes vis-à-vis the Arctic.
The dispute in the South China Sea is even more complex. Drawing on ancient maps and historical accounts, the Chinese and Taiwanese insist that the sea’s two island chains, the Spratlys and the Para- cels, were long occupied by Chinese fisherfolk, and so the entire region belongs to them. The Viet- namese also assert historical ties to the two chains based on long-term fishing activities, while the other littoral states each claim a 200-nautical mile EEZ stretching into the heart of the sea. When com- bined, these various claims produce multiple over- laps, in some instances with three or more states involved—but always including China and Taiwan as claimants. Efforts to devise a formula to resolve the disputes through negotiations sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE- AN) have so far met with failure: While China has offered to negotiate one-on-one with individual states but not in a roundtable with all claimants, the other countries—mindful of China’s greater wealth and power—prefer to negotiate en masse.
Maritime disputes of this sort, also involving the use or threatened use of military force, have surfaced in other parts of the world, including the Sea of Japan, the Celebes Sea, the South Atlantic, and the Eastern Mediterranean. In these and other such cases, adjacent states have announced claims to large swaths of ocean (and the seabed below) that are also claimed in whole or in part by other nearby countries. The countries involved cite various provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to justify their claims—provisions that in some cases seem to contradict one another.
Because the legal machinery for adjudicating offshore boundary disputes remains underdeveloped, and because many states are reluctant to cede authority over these matters to as-yet untested international courts and agencies, most dispu- tants have refused to abandon any of their claims. This makes resolution of the quarrels especially difficult.
What makes these disputes so dangerous, however, is the apparent willingness of many claimants to employ military means in demarking their offshore ter- ritories and demonstrating their resolve to keep them. This is evident, for example, in both the East and South China Seas, where China has repeatedly deployed its naval vessels in an aggressive fashion to assert its claims to the contested islands and chase off ships from all the other claimants. In response, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have also employed their navies in a muscular manner, clearly aiming to show that they will not be intimidated by Bei- jing. Although shots have rarely been fired in these encounters, the ships often sail very close to each other and engage in menacing maneuvers of one sort or another, compounding the risk of accidental escalation.
What appears most lacking in all of these situations is a perception by the larger world community that disputes like these pose a significant threat to international peace and stability. Were these disputes occurring on land, one suspects, world leaders would pay much closer attention to the risks involved and take urgent steps to avoid military action and escalation. But because they are taking place at sea, away from population centers and the media, they seem to have attracted less concern.
This is a dangerous misreading of the perils involved: Because the parties to these disputes appear more inclined to employ military force than they might elsewhere, and boundaries are harder to define, the risk of miscalculation is greater, and so is the potential for violent confrontation. The risks can only grow as the world becomes more reliant on offshore energy and coastal states become less willing to surrender maritime claims.
To prevent the outbreak of serious conflict, the international community must acknowledge the seriousness of these disputes and call on all parties involved to solve them through peaceful means, as quickly as possible. This could occur through resolutions by the UN Security Council, or statements by leaders meeting in such forums as the Group of 20 governments. Such declarations need not specify the precise nature of any particular outcome, but rather must articulate a consensus view that a resolution of some sort is essential for the common good. Arbitration by neutral, internationally respected “elders” can be provided as necessary. To facilitate this process, ambiguities in UNCLOS should be resolved and holdouts from the treaty—including the United States—should be encouraged to sign.
The establishment of clear maritime boundar- ies and the promotion of collaborative offshore enterprises rank among the most important tasks facing the international community as the global competition for resources moves from traditional areas of struggle, such as the Middle East, to seas where the rules of engagement are less defined. The exploitation of offshore oil and gas could help compensate for the decline of existing reserves on land, but will result in increased levels of fric- tion and conflict unless accompanied by efforts to resolve maritime boundary disputes. Defining borders at sea may not be as easy as it is on land, where natural features provide obvious reference points, but it will become increasingly critical as more of the world’s vital resources are extracted from the deep oceans.
As the Asia Pacific region continues to rise, competing claims and counter claims in the maritime domain are becoming more prominent. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the South China Sea. Numerous claimants have asserted broad territorial and sovereignty rights over land features, sea space, and resources in the area. The United States has consistently encouraged all parties to resolve their disputes peacefully through a rules-based approach. The Convention is an important component of this rules-based approach and encourages the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. Here again though, the effectiveness of the U.S. message is somewhat less credible than it might otherwise be, due to the fact that we are not a party to the Convention.
Some States in the USPACOM AOR have adopted deliberate strategies vis-à-vis the United States to try to manipulate international law to achieve desired ends. Such strategies are infinitely more achievable when working within the customary international law realm, versus the realm of treaty-based law. By joining the Convention, we greatly reduce this interpretive maneuver space of others and we place ourselves in a much stronger position to demand adherence by others to the rules contained in the Convention – rules that we have been following, protecting and promoting from the outside for many decades.