Evidence: Most Popular
Proponents of UNCLOS assert that the treaty does not significantly impact the way the United States military conducts MIOs.53 During peacetime, UNCLOS permits the following: the boarding of vessels that are flying the flag of the boarding state, the boarding of vessels that consent to boarding, the boarding of vessels that are entering coastal state ports, and the boarding of stateless vessels.54 During wartime or armed conflict, UNCLOS allows boardings in self-defense if under attack or threat of attack and in accordance with other established maritime law and laws of armed conflict.55 These provisions are sufficient for the United States to continue to carryout MIO missions as currently employed.
UNCLOS promotes the United States' freedom of navigation rights in at least three ways.39 First, the Convention limits coastal States' territorial seas to twelve nautical miles.40 Second, UNCLOS affords innocent passage of ships and aircraft through other countries' territorial seas and archipelagoes, as well as through straits used for international navigation.41 Finally, the Convention sets forth maximum navigational rights and freedoms for ships and aircraft in exclusive economic zones.42 In regards to the United States' non-party status, proponents of UNCLOS argue that while these rights may exist in customary law, joining the Convention would put these provisions on firmer legal footing, as rights embodied in a treaty are more fixed than those in customary law.43 "The United States, the Law of the Sea Convention, and Freedom of Navigation." Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Vol. 29. (2005-2006): 1-24. [ More (4 quotes) ]
Nevertheless, opponents of UNCLOS find that United States accession to the treaty would directly contradict the goals of PSI.31 Specifically, opponents assert that if the United States does not become a party to the Convention, it will be free from any constraints in relation to ocean law, and thus, better suited to pursue the goals of PSI.32 This argument, however, is weakened by the fact that the United States is already a party to the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea, subjecting it to many of the same provisions articulated in the current iteration of UNCLOS.33 While the 1982 Convention modified many elements of the 1958 Convention, several key provisions remained in place, including many governing activities in territorial seas, continguous zones, and the high seas. Additionally, because UNCLOS is largely rooted in customary law, opponents of UNCLOS assert that the United States is already subject to many of its provisions implicitly.34 In the absence of a treaty, the United States must rely on and abide by customary law, which is defined by the pattern and practice of states. Since so many nations are already a party to UNCLOS, their practices largely influence the body of customary law on which the United States must rely if it does not ratify UNCLOS.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, is an international effort promoting the global interdiction of shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems worldwide.25 On September 4, 2003, the eleven participating nations released a statement in Paris outlining PSI's initiatives.26 The aim of PSI is to create an enhanced approach to preventing proliferation of WMD.27 In order to ensure congruence with other bodies of law, PSI specifically states that it will be implemented as is consistent with national law and international law.28 All of the PSI partners, with the exception of the United States, are already parties to UNCLOS.29 "The Senate should give immediate advice and consent to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: why the critics are wrong.." Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 59, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2005) [ More (18 quotes) ] This fact demonstrates that state national security interests under the PSI are not put in jeopardy by becoming a party to UNCLOS. Indeed, John Bolton, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, argued that UNCLOS will not impede the goals of the PSI in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating: "Ifthe Senate were to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty and the president were to make the treaty [...] it would not have any negative impact whatsoever on PSI."30
The urgency for the United States joining the convention is twofold. First, by not being a state party to the convention, the United States is unable to nominate or elect the expert commissioners who carry out the work of the CLCS. That reduces the ability of the United States to contribute to the work of the commission and ensure that the convention is applied fairly and objectively. Moreover, when Russia submitted what many considered an overly expansive claim in the Arctic Ocean in 2001, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, could only file a demarche listing U.S. objections. By not acceding the convention, the United States has no standing before the commission in what will be the largest adjudication of state jurisdiction in world history. Remaining a nonparty also prevents the United States from making its own submission to the commission. The State Department is currently overseeing an effort to collect evidence for an eventual American claim to the extended continental shelf, but the United States cannot formally submit this package for review by the CLCS until it formally joins the convention. By not joining, the United States is actually giving up sovereign rights—missing an opportunity for international recognition for a massive expansion of U.S. resources jurisdiction over as much as one million square kilometers of ocean, an area half the size of the Louisiana Purchase. Remaining outside the convention prevents the United States from participating in the process of overseeing the claims of other countries to the extended continental shelf and from formally making its own.
Implementing the maritime and national security strategies in the current geopolitical environment requires that U.S. armed forces be provided not only with the convention’s rights, freedoms, and protections necessary to facilitate military operations but also with the legal legitimacy necessary to build partnerships, trust, and confidence with nations around the globe. Currently, American armed forces are ham- strung when the United States publicly solicits other nations to join it in enforcing the rule of law, while at the same time refuses to join the international legal frameworks necessary to establish such rule. The U.S. failure to join the convention has directly prevented expansion of the PSI with some critically important Pacific countries. Although these countries are supportive of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, they indicate that U.S. refusal to join the convention has eroded their confidence that the United States will abide by international law when conducting PSI interdiction activities. Remaining outside the convention risks further damaging American efforts to develop cooperative maritime partnerships, such as PSI, and undermining implementation of U.S. security strategies that require the confidence and trust of other nations.
Why are the provisions and protections of the convention vital to implementing U.S. national defense and maritime strategies? Why now? All six core capabilities of U.S. maritime forces are predicated upon legally certain freedom of navigation and overflight, as defined by the United States and codified in the convention. Joining the convention supports the strategic and operational mobility of American air, surface, and submarine forces. It provides legal guarantees for those forces to transit the high seas, exclusive economic zones, international straits, and archipelagic sea routes during times of crisis. It supports the freedom of those forces to legally conduct military survey, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering under the terms and conditions the United States prefers. It allows the high-seas interdiction of stateless vessels and illegal activities under frameworks such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, using the protocols the United States carefully crafted to conform to the convention. Most recently, this year articles 100 and 105 of the convention have been applied as the basis of an agreement with Kenya to prosecute Somali pirates apprehended in the Indian Ocean.
Additionally, ratification of the Convention will soften the United States’ image and signal much needed goodwill to the international community.110 It has been noted that “[a]nti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the U.S.’ soft power—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them—is in decline as a result.”111 Commitment to the Convention, which engages much of the international community, would be emphasized by U.S. ratification.112 It also allows other states to place their trust in the U.S. and thus its actions on the seas. This is essential for the United States to maintain its legitimacy and ultimate leverage in the international arena.113
There is no doubt that external dispute resolution infringes upon U.S. sovereignty and it is therefore not surprising that staunch advocates of sovereignty steadfastly oppose the Convention, in part due to its dispute resolution mechanisms. However, the costs associated with the Convention’s dispute resolution provision are similar to those the United States is already subject to under principles of universal jurisdiction and territoriality. Furthermore, the Convention provides the United States with an escape from mandatory dispute resolution. In light of this, arguments against ratification of the Convention based upon sovereignty rooted in the dispute resolution mechanisms are outweighed by the benefits the Convention offers to the United States.91
Ratification of the Convention is an urgent matter. Although a state has up to ten years after it has ratified the Convention to map and submit proposed limits of its continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, by that time it may be too late.196 Global climate change has caused parts of the Arctic Seacap to begin melting, making it navigable for the first time.197 While this is promising for underwater mining industries, these environmental effects have attracted a great deal of attention and the international community is cooperating to reverse them.198 Instead of engaging in fruitless political battles with its strategic adversaries, the United States should move quickly to ratify the Convention and focus its energy on extracting the resources beneath the Arctic as quickly as possible.199 Ratification “would allow full implementation of the rights afforded by the convention, [allowing member nations] to protect coastal and ocean resources.”200