Evidence: Most Popular
Responding to a question posed by Senator Lugar at a 2003 SFRC hearing regarding whether a tribunal could trump a state’s decision regarding whether an activity was “military” in nature, John Norton Moore emphatically stated"Statement of John Norton Moore: Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: Urgent Unfisinshed Business ." Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 14, 2003. [ More (5 quotes) ]: “I believe the chances of this article being interpreted the way some are arguing and posing a risk to the United States is about like your deciding not to hold this hearing today because of the risk of the hearing room being hit by a meteorite. To be frank, Mr. Chairman, this is a silly objection. . . . ”45"Statement of John Norton Moore: Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: Urgent Unfisinshed Business ." Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 14, 2003. [ More (5 quotes) ] The objection by critics of the LOS Convention and the purported risk of an overreaching tribunal misses one of the most basic rules of jurisprudence. If a court or tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction, competence, or authority, such an action would be ultra vires and any decision or judgment issued by that court or tribunal would not be legally binding. Finally, of note is that many other countries have asserted an exemption under Article 298 to include either military activities or matters before the UN Security Council, including, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Germany, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Tunisia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.46 Consequently, there is broad international support for the military activities exemption.
In 2003, Mark Esper, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, testified"Statement of Mark T. Esper: On the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (October 21, 2003) ." Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2003. [ More (3 quotes) ] that the Bush administration closely examined the LOS Convention, pored through the negotiating history of the Treaty, and reviewed the practices of international tribunals constituted under the Convention.43"Statement of Mark T. Esper: On the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (October 21, 2003) ." Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2003. [ More (3 quotes) ] Based on the thorough examination, the administration took the position that the scope of the military activity exemption is solely within the ambit of the authority of each state party to determine for itself. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral William Schachte concurred, stating: “. . . No country would subordinate its international security activities to an international tribunal. . . . Certain disputes about military activities are considered ... to be so sensitive that they are best resolved by diplomatic means.”44
The Government of the United States of America declares, in accordance with article 298(1), that it does not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including, inter alia, the Seabed Disputes Chamber procedure referred to in article 287(2)) with respect to the categories of disputes set forth in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of article 298(1). The United States further declares that its consent to accession to the Convention is conditioned upon the understanding that, under article 298(1)(b), each State Party has the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were ‘‘military activities’’ and that such determinations are not subject to review.37The legal effect of the declaration is to exclude from the jurisdiction of any court, arbitral panel, or the ITLOS any dispute involving the United States arising from military and intelligence activities, as well as matters under consideration at the UN Security Council. The declaration also recognizes that the United States reserves an exclusive right to determine whether a questioned activity constitutes a “military” activity.38 Once removed from review or jurisdiction, U.S. military activities are exempt from exposure to arbitration or outside court ruling, or review by a compulsory international panel or other state. The declaration represents a cornerstone U.S. interpretation and is virtually identical to the one recommended in the 1994 SFRC transmittal package.39 Testifying in 2003, the Department of State Legal Adviser stated that the declaration was essential in order to protect U.S. military activities, such as military surveys and reconnaissance flights, that are conducted over foreign coastal state EEZs, ensuring that those activities are not inappropriately subjected to international dispute resolution procedures.40
The proposed U.S. statements represent a set of terms applicable to U.S. conduct as a party to the Convention and are evidence of state practice. Furthermore, the provisions serve as a comprehensive compilation of U.S. positions on the most critical areas of oceans policy reflected over the years in diplomatic communications and associated policy pronouncements concerning operations by the armed forces of the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense. The statements also outline some of the more important conditions under which the United States will operate within the LOS Convention. In particular, the statements affect the conduct of air and sea exercises, operations, and intelligence activities of the armed forces, and reflect the continuing importance of global freedom of navigation and overflight of military, intelligence, and other public vessels and aircraft. Collectively, the statements affirm activities historically undertaken by the U.S. armed forces throughout the world’s oceans, and recognize that those operations are consistent with the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.27 The seven critical American understandings related to national security and the Law of the Sea Convention are identified below and discussed in detail throughout the remainder of this article.
- Military activities. The U.S. maintains the exclusive right, as a state party to determine whether activities it conducts at sea constitute “military activities,” and therefore are, at the election of the United States, exempt from the provisions concerning mandatory dispute resolution under the terms of the Treaty.28
- Peaceful purposes. The U.S. maintains that the Treaty wording “the seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes” does not create new rights for coastal states or third countries, or generate any new obligations on behalf of naval powers.29
- Innocent passage. In accordance with Article 19 of the LOS Convention, coastal states may not restrict innocent passage based on cargo, means of propulsion, destination, purpose, or flag.30
- Transit and archipelagic sea-lanes passage. Military vessels and aircraft in their normal mode have the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea-lanes passage through archipelagic sea-lanes and other normal routes normally used for international navigation, and coastal states may not restrict such passage.31
- Exclusive economic zone. Restrictions or requirements for prior consent or notification to operate military vessels or aircraft in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are inconsistent with the Convention.32
- Hydrographic and military surveys. Coastal states are not authorized to regulate hydrographic or military surveys in the EEZ, as these activities are separate and distinct from marine scientific research (MSR), which requires coastal state consent.33
- Excessive claims.The United States will continue to oppose excessive coastal state maritime claims, continuing to challenge or protest such claims through bilateral and multilateral and diplomatic forums and demarches, military-to-military engagement, and operational assertions by the air and sea forces of the Navy and Air Force.34
Statements made by states to the LOS Convention have a high degree of importance because Article 309 of the Treaty bars state parties from making reservations. State parties may not except out undesirable language or provisions, as that would undermine the nature of the Convention as a package deal.23 Although states may not make reservations or exceptions when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Treaty, they may provide statements with a view toward harmonizing their domestic laws and regulations with the Convention.24 Article 310 of the Convention provides authority for a state party, at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, or at any time thereafter, to make declarations and statements, provided such statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention. One hundred nineteen states have made such statements, including 33 that have done so upon signature, 60 states that have done so at the time of ratification or accession, and 16 more states that have done so at a later date.25
Both within Democratic and Republican presidential administrations, U.S. govern- ment officials, industry group representatives, and senior officers of the armed forces have forcefully and persuasively testified as to the merits of the LOS Convention for the United States.5 The Treaty is strongly in the American national interest: promoting the require- ments of a global security presence, providing a framework for preservation of maritime mobility and maneuverability, creating a system for facilitating transnational trade and promoting economic prosperity, and creating a regime of binding dispute resolution and conflict avoidance that is a cornerstone for building a stable legal order for the oceans. Indeed, a comprehensive case for U.S. accession already has been made most eloquently by Ambassador John Norton Moore and retired Rear Admiral William L. Schachte in a paper that has been widely distributed on Capitol Hill.6
The United States has a stake in working with other nations to protect the global environment. For that purpose, it has entered into a number of conventions and agreements, such as, for example, conservation agreements to preserve fish stocks in international waters. But it is one thing to agree to a common standard and another thing to be bound by the decisions of an ongoing regulatory council in which the United States can be easily outvoted. It is one thing to agree to submit particular disputes to international arbitration, with the consent of both parties. It is entirely another thing to establish an ongoing court, with mandatory jurisdiction over important matters and an open-ended claim to “advise” on the law apart from particular disputes. It is something else again to embrace a court that, being permanent, may be prey to all the temptations of judicial activism, to extending its authority by enlarging its jurisdiction and winning popularity by playing favorites in its judgments.
The United States has traditionally respected limits on what it can agree to do by treaty. In the past, it has refused to ratify treaties that delegate so much authority to international institutions. By ratifying UNCLOS, we would not only open ourselves to immediate risks and complications regarding actions on the seas, we would also make it harder to resist more ambitious schemes of global governance in the future. We have said in the past that we cannot submit to such impositions on our own sovereignty. President Reagan made this point in rejecting UNCLOS in 1982, pointing to the open-ended regulatory powers of the Authority. If we ratify UNCLOS, we make it much harder to explain—to others, as to ourselves—why we cannot embrace further ventures in “global governance,” like the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol. We would feed demands for similar international control schemes for Antarctica or Outer Space.
By ratifying UNCLOS, the United States would be submitting itself to a much wider range of international controls than it has in the past. Allowing ITLOS to sit in judgment on U.S. naval tactics or allowing the Authority to press U.S. firms to share strategic technologies with countries like China can only prove damaging to U.S. national security. It may also be detrimental to U.S. economic interests to allow the Authority to place conditions on when and how U.S. firms can search for minerals or commercially valuable microbes in the deep seas. In addition, in the long term, there are serious risks involved to American national sovereignty in accepting the underlying premise of UNCLOS III. The most valuable provisions, regarding transit rights and national regulatory rights in exclusive economic zones, are widely accepted. They have therefore a solid claim to be regarded as customary international law. By ratifying the treaty, the United States would be saying that it cannot retain its rights under customary international law unless it agrees to accept new international institutions that other countries happen to favor. Worse, ratification would seem to endorse the notion that American rights can only be secured by appealing to new international institutions. From there it is only a small step to the claim that further progress on other international matters requires submission to new and more far-reaching international controls, developed and implemented by new supranational organs.
Even where the United States retains a veto, it does so in common with all other parties to the treaty, not just with a few major powers, as in the U.N. Security Council. So even if the U.S. can force a stalemate, others can do the same and most of those others have no stake at all in seeing development go forward. The U.S. veto on rules about licensing of specific efforts does not, of course, ensure that favorable rules can be enacted. If mining does ever become financially attractive in the deep seabed, the Authority will remain an awkward regulatory structure. In effect, it subjects the handful of countries—or rather firms from such countries—to regulatory oversight from all the other countries in the world, on the grounds that all have a stake in what happens on the deep seabed. So far, the Authority has only issued one set of regulations (governing exploration for manganese or polymetallic nodules, which might be recovered from the surface of the ocean bottom). It has begun work on a new set of regulations on sulfide crusts, found around volcanic hot springs. Regulations are not likely to be restricted to such mining operations, however. Already, the Authority has been urged to issue regulations to limit bioprospecting for commercial applications of new species—mostly microbial—discovered on vents at the depths of the seas. Here again,the handful of firms with the capacity to undertake such initiatives will be subject to control from bystanders. Yet scientists think that exotic bacteria found only at extreme depths of the sea may offer keys to the development of new antibiotics, antitumor agents for treatment of cancer, and other pharmaceutical applications. And the regulatory reach may extend even further. Given its authority to protect the “marine environment” in the deep seas, the Authority might claim some authority to regulate what is done in territorial waters or even on land, when such activities have some effect on the deep seas.
The 1994 Agreement specifies eligibility for the Council with formulas that would assure the United States a permanent seat—as “the state having the largest GNP”—if it were to ratify UNCLOS. It also assures permanent seats for Russia—as the largest state in “Eastern Europe”—and China and India—under a set-aside for “states with large populations.” There will, in any case, always be a majority of developing countries on the Council, given various other eligibility formulas. For instance, only four of the 36 seats are reserved for “states which have made the largest investments in [deep sea mining] activities.”22
Contrary to some advocates’ claims, the 1994 supplementary agreement does not give the U.S. a veto over actions of the Authority. Under UNCLOS, the Council is only required to act by “consensus”—so that one negative vote would constitute a veto—when it endorses “rules, regulations and procedures [which] relate to prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area,” that is, the deep seabed.23 However, the 1994 agreement specifies that the Council may make decisions by two-thirds vote on matters of “substance” and by mere majority on matters of “procedure”24 Thus, a mere majority may decide, as a matter of “procedure,” when a seemingly “substantive” decision is really only procedural, empowering the deciding majority to decide on further questions by a simple majority vote.