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Under the convention, the United States assumes a number of obligations at odds with its military practices and national security interests, including a commitment not to collect intelligence. The U.S. would sign away its ability to collect intelligence vital for American security within the “territorial waters” of any other country (Article 19). Further- more, U.S. submarines would be required to travel on the surface and show their flags while sailing within territorial waters (Article 20). This would apply, for example, to U.S. submarines maneuvering in Iranian or North Korean territorial waters; they would be required to sail on the surface with their flags waving.
President Reagan rejected the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 and cited several major deficiencies, none of which have been remedied. Reagan was concerned that the U.S., though a major naval power, would have little influence at the International Seabed Authority that the convention created. Although the Authority is supposed to make decisions by consensus, nothing prevents the rest of the “international community” from consistently voting against the United States, as regularly occurs in similar U.N. bodies, such as the General Assembly. In addition, President Reagan was troubled by the fact that the International Seabed Authority has the power to amend the convention without U.S. consent. That concern has also not been remedied in the intervening years.
As the Navy explores the potential strategic advantages to be gained from such a multifaceted AFSM (I) as the Ponce, the need for the United States to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention becomes increasingly paramount. The question here is not about whether the Law of the Sea would allow the United States to retaliate militarily against Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, nor is it about whether under the treaty Iran has the right to close the Strait in the first place.
With or without the treaty, the United States could proceed to respond to the current Iran tension with an escalation of naval power in the region; however, what the Law of the Sea would provide the United States is something crucial and entirely essential to a smarter, more effective national security strategy— legitimacy.
As a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, the United States and its naval fleet would be protecting the Freedom of Navigation and the Right to Innocent Passage in the Strait of Hormuz with the full force of international law behind it. Even though Iran itself is not party to the convention, America’s ratification would create a new international norm, thus opening the door to a healthy and stable multilateralism in response to crises of global import such as the one we are facing today.
Considering that U.S. experts estimate that Iran could build a nuclear weapon in one year— should it decide to do so— in addition to conflicting, yet alarming reports that the Iranian government is considering legislation to close the Strait of Hormuz through which one fifth of the world’s oil supply is shipped, there has never been a better time for the United States to preemptively decide to act within an international legal framework.
The Law of the Sea would be a force-multiplier for American national security strategy. Ratification would enable the United States to use its military prowess in the most holistic, global consensus-building manner possible.
While the ITLOS decision may indeed be cheered in naval circles for its ringing affirmation of the sovereign immunity of warships (possibly also for military aircraft, although they are not defined in the LOS Convention, nor is their sovereign immunity addressed), it also serves as a reminder of the awkward position of the U.S. as a non-party to the LOS Convention (the Convention has been pending before the senate since 1994, but the senate has yet to give its advice and consent to accession). Accordingly, should a similar incident occur involving a U.S. Navy or Coast Guard warship, the U.S. would not be able to apply to the ITLOS for the vessel’s release. Should the U.S. become a party to the LOS Convention, it should also take note of the fact that Argentina shrewdly amended its article 298 declaration on October 26th (four days before instituting its first legal action under Annex VII of the LOS Convention) to remove its early rejection of the LOS Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures with respect to “military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in noncommercial service.” (¶ 34). In presenting the Convention to the senate in 1994, the Clinton administration recommended that the U.S. exempt military activities from the Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Proposed declarations by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 and 2007 adopted that position. This case demonstrates at least one potential drawback to such exemptions.
The presence of a clause providing binding arbitration should not be viewed as a limitation on U.S. sovereignty. The United States retains, as do all countries ratifying UNCLOS, the right to resolve conflicts through diplomatic means. The arbitration provision provides further means for countries to resolve disputes. In essence, it provides additional rights and capabilities to the states that would not normally exist. As such, it serves as an extended means of enforcing sovereignty when diplomatic solutions fail. Therefore, arbitration is not a limit on the sovereignty of states, but rather a guardian of state sovereignty.
If the US fails to ratify UNCLOS, it can still build offshore turbines within the EEZ. The problem is that there would be no internationally recognized governing law. Unsettled law leads to poor economic efficiency. The lack of a governing law in the EEZ limits the incentive to develop offshore wind projects. Current offshore projects within the territorial waters already face uncertainty in U.S. law, which has been a significant obstacle to their success. Uncertainty in the international law applicable to the EEZ may be too great a risk for developers. Developers have no reason to believe the United States would protect their interests over diplomatic relations or shipping concerns. UNCLOS provides, at the very least, a suggestion for how those disputes should be resolved and an indication for how they can be avoided, so constructing a coherent approach to developing offshore wind in the EEZ is possible.
The United States has not ratified UNCLOS because it initially objected to part XI of the treaty, as did many other developed nations.110 The objections to part XI were based on economic and security concerns.111 Part XI recognized the region of seabed and ocean floor beyond the jurisdiction of any state to be the common heritage of humankind.112 Part XI, therefore, requires states to share the financial benefits113 from activities within the region as well as the related technology.114   In response to the objections to these provisions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution to encourage the United States and other objecting states to ratify UNCLOS.115 This resolution, known as the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, allows countries to ratify UNCLOS without being bound to part XI.116 Given that the United States may ratify UNCLOS without part XI, the benefits to the development of offshore wind power are one of the many reasons for the United States to ratify UNCLOS.117
The benefits UNCLOS could provide to securing offshore wind energy interests is a reason to favor U.S. ratification. UNCLOS would protect the United States’ alternative energy interests within the EEZ and continental shelf.148 Wind energy is a resource that is explicitly recognized as enjoying exclusive protection within the EEZ.149 UNCLOS also provides protections for wind turbine installations within the EEZ and continental shelf.150 Furthermore, should there be a dispute between the United States and another country involving wind energy and the law of the sea, there is an established tribunal that will have jurisdiction to hear the dispute.151 Additionally, part XI of UNCLOS is no longer an obstacle to the United States.152 In light of the benefits it would provide to the development of offshore wind power by securing U.S. interests, the United States should ratify UNCLOS.153